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ABSTRACT 
 
An increase in the number of multinational enterprises (MNEs) has increased the 
attention on cross-border challenges, such as transfer price manipulation (TPM). TPM is 
a development issue - it undermines institutions as well as siphons money from 
government revenues that could be directed towards programs for human development. 
Pervasive corruption in the natural resource sector supports an environment where TPM 
can flourish. This paper develops a strategy for combating TPM within the countries of 
the Southern African Customs Union. It does this by 1) defining the terrain of illicit 
flows, both generally and specifically to the abuse of transfer pricing through TPM, as 
well as the nature of corruption in the natural resources sector; 2) exploring the role of 
private actors by examining global trends in transfer pricing, as well generalizing trends 
by public actors from recent actions taken by governments of developing countries; 3) 
exploring the extent of MNE involvement in the natural resources sector within the 
SACU region, as well as the specific legislation surrounding the sector; and lastly, 4) 
developing a strategy based on international norms and standards. A fully accurate 
assessment of TPM is unavailable because of a limited amount of data. Through proxy 
analysis, this paper finds that the transfer pricing and mineral legislation of the SACU 
region fails to regulate TPM adequately. Developing a coordinated strategy based off 
international standards, with the SACU institution and its members as the primary 
drivers, is the best step towards limiting the abuse. 
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Section One: Introduction  
 
Transfer pricing is an often-used mechanism in multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
engaging in intrafirm trade1. Abuse of this common business practice occurs when the 
misinvoicing of transfer prices is a motivated action. As cross-border economic activity 
has increased, so has the amount of transfer pricing between subsidiaries and the parent 
company of MNEs. The standard practice of transfer pricing is increasingly placed in a 
complex environment because goods involved in the MNE production process are often 
traded across countries that have unique tax arrangements, as well as different 
capabilities to actually enforce laws. In developing countries, there remains a lack of 
adequate and complementary laws to regulate transfer pricing, perhaps making the 
environment for abusive pricing through transfer price manipulation (TPM) easier. While 
the challenges of TPM spans across all sectors, it can be particularly problematic in the 
extraction of natural resources, which can often be a haven for corruption and other illicit 
activity. For these reasons, developing countries rich in natural resources, such as those 
of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), should confront this issue seriously. 
Currently there lacks a clear and coordinated strategy within the SACU region to address 
neither TPM nor transparency in the natural resource sector.  
                                                
1 Lorraine Eden (2012) defines intrafirm trade as  “trade [that] occurs between related 
parties (that is, between affiliated units of an MNE)” (et. al., 2012, p. 206). Italics and 
brackets added.  
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One of the main challenges in assessing TPM is the lack of accurate data. This is 
likely due to three interconnected constraints: the clandestine nature of the flow itself; the 
relatively recent attention this issue has gained; and the fact that accounting capacity in 
developing countries tends to be less sophisticated and widespread as in those that are 
more developed. Despite the lack of data, this paper shows that a unique and relevant 
analysis is certainly possible. To accomplish this, it synthesizes the work of a number of 
independent studies and surveys, analyzes appropriate legislation from SACU and its 
member countries, and considers international guidelines to both regulate transfer pricing 
and promote transparency in the natural resource sector. First, this paper reviews illicit 
flows in-depth. Oftentimes, and particularly in the SACU countries, transfer pricing 
legislation is limited or non-existent, meaning that its abuse does not fall strictly into a 
traditional definition of “illicitness.” This must be understood in its complexity, including 
a dimension of legal (or perhaps not yet illegal) flows that are detrimental to economic 
and human development. After clarifying illicit behavior, this paper reviews the literature 
on how illicit behavior undermines institution building, which also impacts development. 
The scope of illicit flows is further narrowed to include a review of the corrupt 
environment that tends to surround the natural resource sector, which most SACU 
country economies heavily depend on. The literature review concludes by reviewing 
transfer pricing, and how its abuse, TPM, fits into the overall discussion of illicit flows. 
TPM presents a challenge for development, though it is hard to capture the entire 
extent of the issue because the illicit activity is, by nature, hard to calculate. Estimates put 
the figures in the billions of potential government revenue lost. These are not small 
numbers for SACU countries that face significant hurdles in development. Equally 
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alarming is that private companies, as evidenced by the Ernst & Young 2010 Global 
Transfer Pricing Survey, are increasingly using transfer pricing, and are keenly aware of 
importance in business strategies. This research, along with investigation into the location 
of the parent company (owners) of extractive natural resource companies in the SACU 
region, points to the likelihood that TPM is a growing problem in the region.  Using the 
existing SACU framework, OECD guidelines for transfer pricing, and Compliance rules 
under the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI); a strategy to effectively 
tackle this form of tax evasion is possible. 
Because of the dearth in data on transfer pricing, this paper seeks to analyze the 
issues through as much proxy material as possible. The methodology is to build a logical 
picture from all of this fragmented information and research to frame the environment for 
TPM to flourish in a region rich in natural resources. Using the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS), the paper explores the size and characteristics of the natural resource 
sector in each SACU member country, including the extent of MNE involvement. This 
paper also builds upon USGS work by investigating the individual mines themselves, and 
documenting where parent companies are headquartered. This characterizes the complex 
environment that MNEs operate (e.g. tax jurisdictions), and helps to map the points at 
which TPM may occur. An analysis of the strength of legal mechanisms to handle TPM 
through examinations of the pertinent legislation for each country, and the SACU 
framework itself, is also included in these country profiles. Then, it explores trends in 
transfer pricing in the private sector. Using the Global Transfer Pricing Survey from the 
international accounting firm Ernst & Young, current trends in transfer pricing point to its 
rise in use as a business mechanism in intrafirm trade, but also a rise in the concerns 
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involving documentation and litigation of potential abuses. Complicating the illicit flow 
of finances through mechanisms like TPM is the position that auditors take in the 
process. Experts surveyed auditors in a number of African countries and found that there 
is often misunderstanding of the auditing role and presence of illicit activity in daily 
business operations, further complicating the environment.  
This paper arrives at the hypothesis that the SACU region is particularly 
vulnerable to TPM. This being said, it is important to develop a strategy for the region to 
address these illicit flows. This involves reform within individual countries, but also a 
coordinated attempt to improve the SACU framework itself. The strategy is multi-
pronged in the fact that it encompasses guidelines based off of international norms and 
standards for transfer pricing from the Organization for Economic Development and 
Cooperation (OECD), as well as coupling this with rules from the internationally 
recognized Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  
The paper is organized as followed. This section concludes with a brief 
conceptualization of the problem. Section 2 is a literature review of illicit financial flows. 
It begins by conceptualizing illicit flows, providing a unique and comprehensive 
definition for “illicit” that expands beyond simply illegality. Then, it reviews the 
perceived effects of illicit flows on development, and explores the problematic 
relationship between private actors and natural resource extraction in creating an 
environment for illicit activity to flourish. Lastly, it uses the previous review to integrate 
the issue of TPM. Section 3 reviews trends in transfer pricing, as well as the available 
evidence of TPM. Following this, it provides a political-economic analysis of the 
potential consequences of increased regulation. Section 4 provides country profiles for 
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the SACU region. It analyzes the environment of natural resource extraction, the extent 
of MNE involvement, as well as tax laws surrounding the sector. It provides a unique 
database of subsidiary and parent company location to characterize the extent of MNE 
involvement. It also analyzes the strength of the legal framework of SACU and its 
member countries to face TPM. Section 5 integrates the use of international standards, 
from the OECD and EITI, to frame policy as a way forward.  Section 6 overviews some 
potentially significant future challenges and briefly concludes the paper. 
The Problem 
The current period of globalization has witnessed an increase in cross-border 
economic activities. Neo-liberalism has, more or less, flourished as global and regional 
integration has spurred new cross-border arrangements in the forms of free trade 
agreements, customs unions, finance arrangements, and even conditional aid-for-
development policies.  One phenomenon, which both drives and is driven by 
globalization, is the growth in the number of multi-national enterprises (MNEs). MNEs 
are defined as private entities that simultaneously operate in more than one country at a 
given time- a result of the “gone global” nature of the production process. The rise in the 
number of MNEs has also coincided with a rise in the number of foreign subsidiaries.  
According to the World Investment Report 2011, there are just over 100, 000 MNE 
“parent corporations,” or majority owner corporations, and nearly 900,000 foreign 
subsidiaries. This is considerably more than the 35,000 parent corporations and 150,000 
foreign subsidiaries in 1990 (1992 World Investment Report). These numbers reflect the 
growth economic integration that is the defining characteristic of globalization.  
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However, integration within politics and decision-making has not followed the 
same trajectory as economies have. Though the number of bi-lateral and multi-lateral 
organizations has indeed grown, cooperation often faces the issue of sovereignty. 
Governments are constrained by the will of those who legitimize their political authority, 
whether it is through the politics of fear, the vote, or some combination of the two. 
Creating consensus and majorities is often difficult; coordinating decision-making 
between countries amplifies this. On the other hand, private economic actors, such as 
MNEs, are more constrained by the marketplace and regulation, the latter of which has 
been challenged by the proliferation of neo-liberalism in globalization. In this 
environment of economic integration, private actors have more flexibility compared to 
political actors, especially when the political climate becomes difficult. Thus, the 
economic effects of globalization have produced conflicting results; through 
globalization, private actors are left with fewer checks, while public actors have been 
confronted with more. 
This paper focuses on, TPM, one of the many challenges faced by the growth of 
MNEs. TPM is the misinvoicing of transfer prices in intrafirm trade.  It tends to be a 
decision made by firms to avoid government regulations, such as taxation, or to take 
advantage others, such as export subsidies. It is easier for MNEs to engage in this 
behavior in developing countries, which are often home to foreign affiliates, because they 
either lack adequate policies on transfer pricing, or don’t have the capacity to enforce 
laws that are present. Furthermore, transfer pricing has only recently received more 
global attention, so available data on the extent of the tax revenues lost are limited. This 
paper views TPM as a serious issue. Different actors are accountable. By avoiding taxes, 
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private firms are circumventing the legitimacy of tax institutions.  This can pose a serious 
problem for the public sector in poorer countries that tend to have less developed tax 
institutions, because tax systems should be able to collect revenue to supplement fiscal 
policies that can support a development policy. Though, private actors that are abusing 
transfer prices are not always completely at fault, corruption in the public sector can 
provide the ideal environment for this illicit flow to flourish. In this way, sometimes 
governments can be their own worst enemies. The interaction between the public and 
private sectors, though, can truly serve development. Literature shows that legitimate tax 
systems are largely seen as a precursor to democracy and creating legitimacy for the 
government as a whole. A well functioning government can support an environment for 
private firms to grow.  
The scope of this paper is the countries of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU): Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Initially signed in 
1910 and revised following decolonization and independence, SACU is considered the 
world’s oldest customs union. This scope gives a good analysis of the challenge of TPM 
because it represents a group of countries that have experienced relatively similar 
histories, face similar problems, but allows flexibility for marked differences in economic 
development and governance capabilities. A narrow scope within this region is the 
natural resource sector. The extraction of natural resources is often associated with 
corruption and illicit activity, transfer pricing is likely one of them. All SACU countries 
are integrated within the global extractive natural resource web and are home to 
subsidiaries whose parent companies are found in well-developed economies in North 
America, Europe and Asia. This exposes them to the abuse of TPM.  
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One challenge faced by this paper is the inability to gain substantial data on 
transfer pricing within these countries. The reality is that the United States is one of the 
only countries that report data for intrafirm trade, although the OECD has been working 
towards collecting this for its member countries. Compounding this difficulty is the fact 
that, given the clandestine nature of TPM, it is unlikely that purely accurate data will be 
available in the future. Regardless of these challenges, a skillful analysis is still possible. 
SACU provides documents on laws regarding customs relations between member 
countries, each country also has adequate information regarding their individual tax 
policies, and a plethora of literature exists assessing institutional development and 
taxation.  
Mapping the Terrain 
 This introduction accurately demonstrates the complexity of TPM. Below, Figure 
1 depicts a simple logical framework of intrafirm trade in the natural resource sector.  
Figure 1: Concept Map for Intrafirm Trade2 
 
                                                
2 For further simplicity, this concept map generalizes the extent of additional subsidiaries 
in the production process. While they often exist, this paper does not focus on the specific 
operations of subsidiaries. This varies depending on the type of resource extracted. As 
more data on transfer pricing, as well as methods to measure transfer price manipulation, 
is gathered, this can supplement such research. 
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Mining subsidiaries extract a resource then sell it to the next company in the production 
chain, and so on. These other subsidiaries are involved in a number of different 
operations depending on the type of resource extracted; for example, this may be a 
factory specializing in cutting and polishing diamonds, refining for coal, or smelting for 
iron-ore. Though, all subsidiaries share the characteristic of being wholly owned and 
managed by parent companies. As goods move along the value-chain, it enters different 
tax jurisdictions, requiring a transfer price of the good. Oftentimes, these jurisdictions 
lack complementary tax laws, meaning that companies may have additional cost burdens 
when transferring into jurisdictions with higher tax rates. The complexity of TPM occurs 
at the points where customs duties are collected. It is defined as the “over- or under- 
invoicing of transfer prices by MNEs” (Eden, 2012, p. 206). Inadequate laws regulating 
the natural resource sector and transfer pricing in the SACU region may allow MNEs to 
circumvent regulation. In corrupt environments, particularly those in the natural resource 
sector, public officials (e.g. customs officials) may allow the abuse of transfer prices in 
return for bribes and kickbacks; in collusion, private actors in MNEs may engage in 
abusing transfer pricing in order to decrease costs and increase profits. Regardless of who 
is responsible for TPM, which requires a microscopic view of each action taken, it is 
often development that suffers. This paper will explore the issues outlined and 
conceptualized in this introduction, in order to suggest a framework for action.  
 
. 
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Section Two: Illicit Financial Flows 
 
There is an ample amount of literature surrounding illicit financial flows.  Much 
of the attention is given to more “traditional” illicit flows such as human and drug 
trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering. Only recently has the literature on 
transfer price manipulation begun to expand. Availability and accuracy of data, 
compounded with the clandestine nature of the illicit flows themselves, remains a serious 
problem in analyses of this issue. However, some researchers have developed 
methodologies to capture as much data as possible, as well as create estimates. According 
to a Global Financial Integrity (Kar & Cartwright Smith, 2008) report, illicit financial 
flows through Africa totaled about $854 billion, but due to the measuring constraints, the 
total is more likely near $1.8 trillion. To put this in perspective, if the true figure is closer 
to the latter number, illicit financial flows into and out of the continent represent the size 
of the 2005 GDP of all African countries combined (World Bank).  Following their 
analyses, the authors suspect that commercial tax evasion (TPM being one type) accounts 
for about 60 – 65% of the conservative estimate. From a developmentalist point of view, 
the question must be asked: where would these flows have otherwise gone? Of course, it 
is unlikely that all of this money would be directed towards a developmental purpose, but 
increasing government revenues is important for creating sound governance institutions, 
which can then support a larger developmental structure. First, this discussion requires a 
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definition of “illicit” because the term is often hastily used but rarely understood. Then, 
we can analyze how this impacts development. 
Illicitness, (Il)Legality, and Immorality 
Illicitness is typically defined as unlawfulness. While this is not incorrect, it is 
simplistic and should be understand in a more nuanced way. In fact, there are many 
negative actions that are either legal, or simply left undefined in law. For example, the 
billions of US dollars that were packaged into confusing derivatives and other various 
financial instruments were legal, for the most part, but they brought the global economy 
to a halt, as there was little liquid capital to back up bad assets. This resulted in the worst 
economic downturn since the Great Depression. One can ascertain the legality of these 
transactions, but it may be difficult to argue in favor of them given the hardship they 
created for much of society. Regardless of their legal standing, these actions are generally 
considered “wrong.” The following literature review examines some of the nuances 
involved in defining illicitness. This will provide the foundation for framing transfer 
price manipulation as an impediment to development. 
The most common and agreed upon description of illicit financial flows involves 
those that are explicitly related to the exploitation and abuse of humans, such as human 
trafficking in the sex trade or child soldiers; those that involve general abuse of global 
social norms related to moral issues in the trafficking of drugs and arms; or those 
traditionally associated with common financial norms like commercial tax evasion, 
money laundering and racketeering. Prescriptively, “illicit financial flows may then be 
defined as any capital transaction that intentionally moves capital unrecordedly out of a 
country” (Nitsch, 2011). In other words, illicit flows are clandestine and motivated 
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actions to remain hidden from authority. However, Max Everest-Phillips (2012) argues 
that there are different forms of illicit financial behavior beyond traditionally recognized 
activities. To frame his argument he relies on the premise that perceptions of illicit 
behavior are rooted in illegitimacy. They certainly include any activity that is illegal as in 
the Nitsch definition above, but also include anything that is “immoral in undermining 
the state’s willingness and capacity to deliver better lives for its citizens” (et. al., 2012, 
pp. 70 - 71). This is based on the notion that a capable and legitimate state is needed to 
direct development, growth and security. While most can agree on the definition of 
traditional forms of illicit flows, should these “immoral flows” be included? Working 
from the Everest-Phillips definition, and applying it to an issue like capital flight (a 
reaction to both political and economic environments), requires delineation. The author 
argues that  “flight indicates exit from risk; flow is simply a movement of liquid financial 
assets” (et. al., 2012, p. 71). Illegal capital flight is an unlawful, yet rational movement of 
assets; legal capital flight is lawful and rational. On the flow side, illegal capital flows 
can be described in the way above- a movement of assets to hide from authority, and 
legal capital flows are simply lawful movements of assets. The problematic position that 
the author takes in describing these four dimensions of capital movement is that his legal 
definition takes a humanistic point of view; the use of the word “immoral” is certainly a 
testament to this. Legality can be further delineated to include movements that occur 
outside the confines of any codified law, or, potentially immoral/illicit behavior. In this 
sense, legal or undefined capital flight should be considered illicit. Here, the author 
primarily focuses on institution building through effective taxation. Capable and 
legitimate tax institutions are important for state building because they  
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“reflect the intrinsic legitimacy of the state (based on 
consent, manifested among taxpayers as tax morale, their 
inherent willingness to pay taxes) and funds the 
effectiveness of state institutions (manifested in actual 
compliance)” (Everest-Phillips, 2012).  
 
The author argues that there is an explicit link between weak institutions and illicit flows. 
He explores tax evasion in Latin America and finds that Argentina and Mexico, who have 
not taken as serious of steps as Chile to combat the activity, experience higher rates of it. 
Although a serious analysis of the public domain for illicit activity to flourish, Everest-
Phillips presents a fairly narrow scope, going as far as to say that “politics and 
institutions, not geography or economic structure, drive rates of capital flight” (et. al., 
2012, p. 72). This statement is alarming because, first, institutions affect both the 
development of political, economic and social structures within countries, and secondly, 
capital has a preference for the market, which is informed by institutional arrangements, 
and will likely move where it can be the most productive and efficient.  
Stephanie Blankenburg and Mushtaq Kahn (2012) claim that illicit flows have 
flourished in an integrated, yet “opaque” international financial system. Like Max 
Everest-Phillips, they also define illicitness in a nuanced way, describing  
“an illicit financial flow… [as] one that has an overall 
negative effect on economic growth, taking into account 
both direct and indirect effects in the context of the specific 
political settlement of a country” (et. al., 2012, p. 23).   
 
They separate the types of illicit flows to the following: 
• Portfolio choice follows from a neo-liberal standpoint of profit maximization, 
utility and rational choice. That is, firms will move capital from environments that 
promise less after-tax returns to those that promise more. Calculations of risk are 
motivated by structural uncertainty, meaning that private actors are more apt to 
move capital to relatively stable and well-developed markets than those in more 
volatile areas.  
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• Escape from Social Controls is not dramatically different from the portfolio 
approach. While the first approach assumes capital movement due to structural 
irregularities, this one focuses on the social contract of the country. Capital moves 
where it is less likely to be usurped by the social controls present. 
 
• Dirty Money has a fairly simple definition and refers to any movement of capital 
that involves illegal and abusive activities. 
 
Traditional illicit flows follow from the dirty money approach, but the other two 
dimensions are most pertinent for abusive financial operations like TPM. Unique to their 
definition is the presence of the social contract. In so doing, illicitness must account for 
the political settlement, defined as the “reproducible structure of formal and informal 
institutions with an associated distribution of benefits that reflects a sustainable 
distribution of power” (et. al., 2012, p. 23). From this context, regardless of the types and 
extent of regulations, the flow of finance is bound by a broader legal framework as well 
as the larger, and maybe even informal at times, consent of society. Manipulations of 
legal frameworks, which are often the case in developing countries that have weak or 
non-existent legal mechanisms (e.g. towards transfer pricing), are included in this. This 
can become problematic, though, in countries that are governed institutionally by 
different sets of “rules-of-the-game.” Kahn (2010) explains that developed countries, 
through the evolution of judicial processes, had the time and capability to set up formal 
arrangements, but developing countries are often governed implicitly through informal 
arrangements. Even so, different sets of formality and informality exist on a country-by-
country level. In reality, “because the construction of political settlements [or social 
orders] differs significantly across societies, the economic and political effects of 
particular financial flows are also likely to be different” (Blankenburg et. al., 2012, p. 
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26). When defining something as illicit, it becomes clear that different types of 
economies are prone to certain types of “illicitness” than others. For example, developed 
countries are not likely to be prone to the same scope of dirty money as others. This does 
not mean that it is not regarded as a problem, though. As is well known, illicit markets 
exist in some capacity across all levels of development, e.g. drug trafficking to the US, a 
highly developed economy, is driven by demand for illegal drugs, while source and 
transit countries in Latin America, which are not as developed, are driven by supply. 
Unique political, economic, and social environments guide every step along the path of 
the flow. This realization is particularly important for this sort of analysis because 
making broad generalizations can be dangerous.  
Despite its inclusion of what is not always defined by law, defining illicitness 
must include legalistic argument. For a legal positivist, simply defining illicitness based 
on morality can be problematic for proper judicial processes because it is far too nuanced. 
In this sense, it can disrupt the importance of precedent setting. For simplicity purposes, 
this paper considers two aspects of legal theory, first, that laws should be defined 
normatively, and the second that we exist in a world of legal pluralism. Ralf Michaels 
(2009) outlines legal pluralism in the new global context saying it has flourished as a 
result of “the plurality of legal orders, the decentralized position of the state, [and] the 
strengthening of non-state norms”  (et. al., 2009, pp. 21-22). He is candid by the fact that 
normative interpretations of law are vulnerable to the very existence of this legal state, 
because the legal apparatus itself hasn’t caught up to its new environment. In a sense, 
legality is scrambling to find its place, which is likely to continue to be problematic as the 
outcomes of globalization are complex and, at times, even surprising. Regardless of these 
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problems, though, the judicial process must continue; it is prudent to account for 
complexity and nuances. In a lecture on international and comparative law in 2009, 
William Twining (2009) goes further and weds the ideas of normative viewpoints on law 
with legal pluralism, arguing that they have always coexisted; globalization has just 
finally brought them into the forefront of discussion. He draws on a body of legal, 
anthropological and sociological literature, concluding that  
“…mildly positivistic demographic realism in mapping 
legal phenomena in the world is only useful up to a point- 
in sketching a broad context for more specific inquiries. For 
this kind of purpose it is helpful to treat legal pluralism as a 
species of normative pluralism to be sensitive to problems 
of individuation (of norms, normative orders, and legal 
traditions)” (Twining, 2009, p. 514). 
 
Even from a technical point-of-view it is important to account for legal pluralism because 
developing countries often lack the same judicial capacity as developed ones. This is also 
pertinent when exploring cross-border transactions involving MNEs in jurisdictions with 
different levels of development, because the terrain between businesses operating in 
different jurisdictions can be quite opaque. 
From this literature review we can see that definitions of illicit are more nuanced 
than one may think. Of course, they still include the traditional types such as dirty money, 
but they may also include what is immoral, and also what violates a social contract. 
These are things that may or may not be adjudicated through a legal process. Even if the 
above arguments remain unconvincing, one can still follow the logic. From a teleological 
perspective, social norms have accounted for types of traditionally illicit behavior 
because they come from somewhere: the purpose to know what are considered “good” 
and what are “bad” practices. Exploitation of humans, promoting violence, and engaging 
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in financial fraud like commercial tax evasion are generally considered “bad” because 
they produce negative results. However, realizing that humans have limits, and that often 
adjudicating right and wrong lags behind what is actually right and wrong, there is 
definitely more to the world that is illicit. In trying to understand the subject of this paper, 
transfer price manipulation, we will need to move beyond simplistic definitions.  
Illicit Financial Flows and Development 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this work, Global Financial Integrity (Kar & 
Cartwright-Smith, 2008) indicates that there has been $854 billion in illicit flows into and 
out of Africa, but given the data constraints, the number is more likely near $1.8 trillion. 
Ndikuma and Boyce (2008) even argue that, if economies account for illicit flows coming 
from Africa, the world’s poorest continent can also be considered a net global creditor. 
One point-of-view argues this money could be spent to address pertinent development 
issues, such as education, health, and infrastructure. The effect, however, is much larger 
than this; illicit flows undermine the legitimacy of the state and institution building, 
which often provide the basis for a developmental structure. Having framed a more 
nuanced meaning of illicitness, this literature review continues by exploring the 
interaction between illicit movement of capital and its affects on institutions. 
Institutions play an important role in development. In the 20th century, a culture of 
neo-liberalism pervaded economic circles as policymakers called for liberalization and 
deregulation. Today, neo-liberalism is still a valid viewpoint, but given the damage 
deregulation proved to do in the wake of the global recession of 2008, it shares important 
with other theories that may be more managerial in style. For the market to flourish, neo-
liberals should understand that institutional quality and stability could smooth the avenue 
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for capital to move to its most efficient and productive place. In his seminal work, 
Douglas North (1990), incorporates a very basic view of the interaction institutions have 
with the economy. He summarizes that  
“the specific institutional constraints dictate the margins at 
which organizations operate and hence make intelligible 
the interplay between the rules of the game and the 
behavior of the actors” (North, 1990, p. 110).  
 
Institutions drive development because they frame the relationships citizens have with the 
government, the way businesses lead their productive capacities and react to market 
pressures, and the way in which people act and react to one another. Because of the 
nature of these institutions, North is concerned with prescriptive free market economics; 
even though neo-liberal theory posits that the invisible hand of the market will allocate 
capital to its most efficient areas, perfect markets do not exist and some inefficiency will 
always be present. For order in a fast-paced and integrated global market, institutions 
must help direct the movement of capital.  
Other authors also explain the important of institutions towards state development 
and growth. In fact, it is an empirically sound hypothesis. Janine Aron (2000) employs 
regression analysis on a number of variables connected with institutional quality, from 
ease of business to relative amounts of social capital. She finds that the quality of 
institutions on investment (both private and public) show indirect linkages with economic 
growth. Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer (2006) explore the role of institutions in a 
“developmental state,” claiming that “good governance” composes competent, but not 
overreaching, institutions such as those that protect property rights. Gwartney, Holcombe 
and Lawsome (2006) investigate the interaction between institutional quality, with a 
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focus on economic freedom, and public and private investment (separately), and also find 
that they tend to inform growth and development.  
This analysis is most interested in tax institutions. Drawing from the history of 
state building in Europe, and more recent studies in sub-Saharan Africa, Deborah 
Bräutigam (2008) specifically discusses the importance of tax capacity.  She concludes, 
“well-designed tax systems can consolidate stable institutions in developing countries, 
increase revenues, refocus government spending on public priorities, and improve 
democratic accountability” (et. al., 2008, p. 1).  Furthermore, the importance of these 
institutions lies in taxation’s nature as a social contract between the state and its citizens.  
If it is optimal for both sides, taxation serves its purpose in enhancing democracy. Vito 
Tanzi and Howell H. Zee (1992) explore both the conceptual and empirical linkages from 
public finance to long-term growth. They find few robust results from empirical 
literature, but explain that, if taken from the perspective of endogenous growth theory 
(that growth is primarily a result of factors within the economy itself), their results do 
point to some important lessons. This includes  
“recommend[ed] changes in the instruments of public 
finance in the direction that theory has deemed important 
for enhancing growth, such as the adoption of policies to 
improve the neutrality of taxation, promote human capital 
accumulation, and lesson inequality” (Tanzi & Zee, 1992, 
p. 201).  
 
These findings are qualified in a later piece by the same authors (2000) that analyze more 
specific problems involving the strengthing of tax policy in developing countries. These 
include lower levels of human capital and higher rates of inequality that force countries to 
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adopt tax policies that are “possible rather than the pursuit of the optimal” (et. al., 2000, 
p. 300).  
The discussion above outlines how institutions can support growth and 
development, but the effects of illicit flows on institutions are opposite. African countries 
tend to face significant problems with institutional capacity. Ineffective institutions and 
extensive poverty result in narrow tax bases, which lead to a vicious cycle where 
governments are constrained in their ability to raise revenue, which can support 
institution-building and enhance development. Governments, who are ironically one of 
the largest stakeholders in raising revenue, may actually be their own worst enemies 
when it comes to effective taxation. Atul Kohli (2004) refers part of this to the problem 
of a culture of neo-patrimonialism, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, describing it as 
“the façade of a modern state, [where] public officeholders tend to treat public resources 
as their personal patrimony” (et. al., 2004, p. 9). Furthering this, Richard M. Bird (et. al. 
2006) views illicit flows through tax avoidance and evasion in a larger political economic 
relationship. They use regression analysis to explore the role of institutions in improving 
tax collection in developing countries. One of their primary concerns is the issue of tax 
morale. This is intrinsically related to tax effort, or the willingness to pay taxes. They 
hypothesize that “the level of tax effort is [also] expected to be strongly connected to the 
‘exit option’- the decision to conduct, fully or partially, economic activity in the informal 
sector (the shadow economy)” (et. al., 2006, p. 22).   This is the framework for their 
hypothesis that then focuses on common issues in developing countries, including 
inequality. They posit that high inequality damages trust and solidarity between the goals 
of different social classes. The tension lies in fairness of taxes and who receives the 
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benefits of fiscal policy. Because this is often at odds in highly unequal societies, tax 
efforts remain low and widespread tax avoidance and evasion persists. Regression results 
from a selection of institutional variables, political voice and, separately, the size of the 
shadow economy show statistically significant correlations with tax effort. Taxpayer buy-
in may indeed help strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of tax institutions, while 
opportunities to operate outside of the formal economy can have the opposite effect. The 
notion of elite buy-in is particularly important for this analysis because in developing 
countries with low tax bases, these are the incomes that should represent a large portion 
of the tax revenue. Also, this group often has the greatest access to capital and is also the 
most well connected in the global economy, solidifying their importance for state 
development in today’s context. Max Everest-Philips (2009) adds that  
“widespread tax evasion, avoidance and exemptions 
suggest elites believe that the state has neither 
transformational political leadership nor any elite 
consensus for addressing weak or corrupt political 
institutions. Weak elite tax morale results in a large shadow 
economy with widespread tax evasion and avoidance” 
(Everest-Philips, 2009, p. 17).  
 
This echoes the idea that buy-in, or legitimacy, is essential for institutions to be effective. 
Otherwise, capital is apt to move outside of formal markets.  
It is also worth noting the role that some private actors may have in driving illicit 
financial flows. Kari Heggstad and Odd-Heldge Fjelstad (2010) compile and assess the 
existing literature on this topic. With tax evasion, studies by the US Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (ibid. Heggstad et. al., 2010) found that, on multiple 
occasions, some financial institutions were “aggressively marketing methods of hiding 
money from national tax authorities” (et. al., 2010, p. 5). Many times, this money is 
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directed towards “secrecy jurisdictions” or “tax havens.” These are places where private 
actors hold money, receive the utmost confidentiality, and take advantage of tax benefits. 
While the tax benefit is of particular interest to any private actor that is looking to hold 
money, illicit flows are attracted to confidentiality. While there is not much written on the 
marketing methods from financial institutions seeking capital from Africa, it can be 
inferred that the presence of secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens, with which there exists 
more literature for the continent, does have an effect. Furthermore, there are numerous 
accounts of political and business elite in African countries that have sizeable amounts of 
assets out of their countries into these places. As a summary, Professor Njuguna Ndung’u 
(2007), the current Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, explains it clearly. Speaking 
on the importance of institution building as a necessary requisite to stymie the illicit 
financial outflows, particularly capital flight, from Africa, he says:  
“the costs of this financial hemorrhage have been 
significant for African countries. In the short run, massive 
capital outflows and drainage of national savings have 
undermined growth by stifling private capital formation. In 
the medium to long term, delayed investments in support of 
capital formation and expansion have caused the tax base to 
remain narrow” (Ndung’u, 2007). 
 
Illicit Flows, Private Actors and Resource Extraction 
 
 The scope of this thesis focuses on the SACU region, which is rich in natural 
resources. There is a large body of literature that explains that natural resource sector is 
often ripe for illicit activities. Natural resource abundance is often thought of as a curse in 
developing countries for both political and economic reasons; it is associated with 
corruption, dictatorships and political instability, and can lead to Dutch Disease effects- 
where a dependence on exporting resources appreciates the currency, raises the price of 
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other goods, and subsequently makes diversification of the economy difficult.  The first 
question that we must ask is: Why are foreign companies attracted to investment in 
natural resources? This garners a pretty straightforward answer. Natural resource 
commodities are lucrative ventures, especially in today’s market of high commodity 
prices for primary goods. Natural resource extraction requires much fixed capital, along 
with the latest technology to extract resources most efficiently. For developing countries, 
raising this capital when there are other budget priorities may be a difficult task; MNEs 
tend to have the capital advantage to engage in such activities. Furthermore, labor 
standards in developing countries aren’t as strong as in richer parts of the world, and 
coupled with an abundance of unskilled labor, variable costs to operate tend to be lower.  
What is interesting about this neo-liberally prescriptive assessment, though, is that private 
investment in natural resources should be approached more prudently. Natural resource 
extraction is often riddled in corruption, and sometimes conflict- both generally thought 
of as highly risky environments to operate in. John Bray (2003) echoes the concern for 
the culture of neo-patrimonialism, saying that it makes it lucrative for local leaders to 
accept foreign investment. He examines the business motives of foreign actors, saying  
“the ‘major’ companies in both [petroleum and mining] 
sectors need to build up new resources as existing reserves 
become depleted. The ‘junior’ companies hope to make 
their fortunes by taking risks in regions where more 
established companies are reluctant to venture” (Bray, 
2003, p. 289).  
 
In addition to the ability to maintain or gain market share, part of the profit motive for 
foreign companies actually includes the risk premiums involved, regardless of the 
circumstances. Moran (2006) analyzes the challenge from the view of foreign direct 
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investment opportunities for the host country, he points out to a particular phenomenon in 
contract arrangements that he deems the “obsolescing bargain model” (et. al., 2006, pp. 
77–80).  This occurs when, once open to FDI in an extractive industry, host countries 
require renegotiation of contracts, normally to share in assets, if the projects are 
successful. The obsolescing contract can ensure mutual destruction in the success of FDI 
because the host country erects barriers to FDI and loses credibility. Since extractive 
resources and infrastructure are also vulnerable to bribery and corruption, the benefits of 
FDI harder to attain.  Moran explains that contracts to begin projects, or project partners 
themselves, can be obtained through special relationships (bribery and corruption are 
normally political in nature).  Both developing and developed countries are at fault in 
these instances because both parties are obligated to see “success” (i.e. profits, not 
necessarily efficiency) in the project, while maintaining both at privileged status.  This 
political economy of resource extraction can be quite problematic when there are weak 
mechanisms to address the issue.  
Jonathan M. Winer and Trifin J. Roule (2003) argue that globalization has indeed 
come with more regulation of financial flows, particularly through initiatives to stop 
illicit flows of drugs and money laundering from crime syndicates. However, 
international financial regulation is lacking in the natural resource sector.  
“The closest the current standards come to dealing with 
these issues are the requirements that financial institutions 
eschew the proceeds of corruption and they respect UN 
sanctions [if conflict is involved in extraction]. While these 
standards have existed in principle for a long time, 
enforcement is very recent and remains incomplete” (Winer 
& Roule, 2003, p. 163).  
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They point out that the current global financial system fosters illicit activity in this sector. 
The actors involved in illicit flows of natural resources seem to use common social and 
physical networks that include: informal local banking, natural infrastructure, physical 
infrastructure built under the auspices of certain conditions of lax financial regulations, 
import-export companies that may engage in transfer price manipulation, and 
international banking schemes in secrecy jurisdictions.  
 According to African Economic Outlook (2012) some of the biggest challenges 
faced in the natural resource sector include the clause that many MNE subsidiaries and 
countries make with parent companies in developed and emerging markets that require 
strong confidentiality. This creates an environment of secrecy where accounting rules 
may be manipulated for tax evasive purposes. MNEs operating in the natural resource 
sector are often shrouded in more secrecy than other sectors. Accordingly, there is a 
logical assumption that developing countries rich in natural resources are not benefiting 
from the amount of taxes they can gain from the sector itself. This moves beyond a 
simplistic description that poor countries lack the capacity to do this.  
Transfer Price Manipulation 
 
Transfer pricing is a mechanism often used in MNE operations as goods move 
along a multi-jurisdictional production process. Abusive of this mechanism, TPM, occurs 
is the “over- or under invoicing of these transfer prices. It is generally understood as a 
response to external pressures such as government regulations (Eden, 2012, p. 206). 
Transfer price manipulation is an illicit flow that endangers developing countries ability 
to create capable and legitimate institutions. To assess TPM, we must first understand of 
transfer pricing. Jack Hirschleifer (1956) provides one of the first comprehensive 
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assessments of transfer pricing. He argues from a fairly strict neo-liberal standpoint, 
saying that if transfer pricing is going to be practiced between foreign affiliates, it must 
respond to market pressure in a rational and efficient manner; transfer prices must follow 
the rules of perfectly competitive markets. Although, understanding that perfectly 
competitive markets do not exist, he also provides a prescription on transfer pricing under 
more realistic assumptions. Concisely, he says  
“[the] market price is the correct transfer price only where 
the commodity being transferred is produced in a 
competitive market, that is, competitive in the theoretical 
sense that no single producer considers himself large 
enough to influence price by his own output decision. If the 
market is imperfectly competitive, or where no market for 
the transferred commodity exists, the correct procedure is 
to transfer at a marginal cost (given certain simplifying 
conditions) or at a some price between marginal cost and 
market price in the most general case” (Hirschleifer, 1956, 
p. 172). 
 
Generally, the purpose of having subsidiaries is a company strategy to both operate closer 
to the good in order to reduce overall costs. Because of this, it makes economic sense to 
conduct subsidiary operations in locations close to fixed capital operations, adequate 
marginal price environments (depending on the necessities of things like unskilled or 
skilled labor, e.g.), and proximity to resources themselves. Hirschleifer concludes that 
pricing outside of either the market price or the marginal transfer price (the next-to 
perfect pricing), would distort the market in a way that could produce suboptimal results 
for the different subsidiaries involved in the trade.  
Thomas Horst (1971) explores the relationship that multinational enterprises take 
with differing tariff rates across countries. His view, like Hirschleifer’s, also comes from 
a neo-liberal standpoint, but the blame for problems like TPM lies in ineffective 
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government policy, particularly in countries that practice import substitution. He frames 
his argument from the standpoint that MNEs are interested in chasing economies-of-scale 
through a maximization of profit and driving down marginal costs. For him, governments 
are interested in maintaining macroeconomic stability, which must include a growth-
oriented business environment. In import substitution, governments set import tariffs 
higher with the hope to stimulate business growth in the home country. He finds this 
strategy problematic in the fact that MNEs operate in different countries and import-
substitution can create higher operation costs. The high-tariff environment provides 
MNEs with the incentive to discriminate prices, which then “renders tax policy impotent” 
(et. al., 1971, p. 1068). In this sense, it does not allow the government to use tax policy in 
ways that could complement development. Instead, he advocates away from using 
import-substitution and to pursue reciprocal tariff reduction agreements to decrease the 
ability to manipulate prices, and allow the logic of free trade to play out and reduce prices 
through free market mechanisms.  
From these theoretical analyses of transfer pricing, we can conclude that the 
practice, as it should be in a fair and mostly competitive market, is to chase market 
prices. That being said, it makes sense why MNEs choose to engage operations in 
countries that decrease overall costs for the company and its subsidiaries, however it also 
denies the logic to engage in abusive TPM because it directly contradicts fair market 
thinking. Harry Grubert and John Mutti (1991) explore the empirical evidence that shapes 
some of these theoretical analyses. Given the different bilateral (and sometimes 
multilateral) trade tariff and business tax rate schemes, they are keenly interested in the 
willingness of US-based MNEs to operate abroad. Overall they find that taxes and tariffs 
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have a significant impact on the willingness of MNEs to operate in foreign countries, 
particularly from their hypothesis of complementarities. That is, MNEs have a vested 
interested in operating in tax-friendly countries, but also where there are already existing 
patterns of trade that reinforce the economic relationship. For them, these reinforce each 
other. Not surprisingly, this is a result in trade where countries with US-MNE affiliates 
and lower tax rates see higher investment in capital goods flowing into the country. At 
the same time, intrafirm trade is also increased through these established networks.  
Deborah Swenson (2000) bridges the gap between the theories behind transfer 
pricing, and transfer price manipulation. She hypothesizes that, since TPM is a reaction to 
government regulation, the practice will move with corporate tax policy. She measures 
the impact of tariffs between companies operating in a group of largely rich and 
developed countries and finds that a lowering of foreign corporate taxes of 5% results in 
an increase of transfer prices by 0.024%. This is important for two reasons, first it can 
serve the argument that companies lower their tax burdens (e.g. engage in TPM) in the 
face of higher taxes, but also, as a result of the scant improvement in prices, companies 
are profit-motivated to the extent that paying any taxes at all is too big of a burden. Harry 
Grubert (2003) offers an econometric model to depict the willingness of MNEs to engage 
in TPM. Like previous authors, his argument is set in the context that firms will chase 
operating environments that have lower costs. From his previous analysis with John 
Mutti (1991), we understood that higher levels of intrafirm trade occurred where there 
were stronger trade links already established between countries and companies, 
particularly those were it is complimented by lower tax regimes. In the more recent piece 
(2003), he argues that the very existence of these relationships enables increasing number 
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of opportunities to engage in intercompany trade. So the logic follows that there is a 
higher probability of TPM. His addition comes from companies operating in different tax 
jurisdictions. The incentives are created, amongst the environment of high intercompany 
transactions, to “take advantage of the ambiguity in the application of transfer pricing 
rules” (et. al., 2003, p. 231). This alludes that there is a difference in capabilities of legal 
systems, to either adjudicate existing laws on transfer pricing or even have such laws 
codified, which are both relevant questions considering the different institutional 
development levels between rich and poor countries. Interested in the aptitude for 
companies to shift income where costs are lower, he uses a variable called “shifting 
incentive,” and finds that a 1 percent increase in local subsidiary tax rates, beyond a 25 
percent ‘average’ foreign corporate tax rate, results in increases of intercompany 
transactions by 3 percent. Coincidentally, when measured separately, 1 percent change in 
effective local tax rates is associated with a 3 percent increase in the amount of 
intercompany transactions. Beyond statistical constraints such as collinearity, this 
suggests that in a scheme of higher taxes, once the environment proves ripe for intrafirm 
trade to take place, the practice of transfer pricing will continue. Therefore, the 
vulnerability for firms to TPM remains.  
Prem Sikka and Hugh Willmott (2010) are concerned with the extent to which 
TPM has misallocated economic “surpluses” away from government budgets. They write 
from the view that in the globalized world, MNEs have largely taken advantage of an 
opaque set of international laws and norms, and have “gamed the system.” Transfer 
pricing is a coordinated effort by MNEs, through many actors such as lawyers, 
accountants, political connections, business leaders and more, to achieve competitive 
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advantages and economies of scale. For them, globalization has facilitated the ability for 
MNEs to by-pass state authority to the extent that The Times (ibid. 2006) named TPM 
“one of the most significant challenges” in the new era of globalization. Sikka and 
Willmott (2010) draw on evidence from the few places where they can obtain it, namely: 
the amount of corporate taxes paid by MNEs (a potential indication of movements 
towards “low-tax” jurisdictions, or those with loose or non-codified laws on pricing), the 
amount of intercompany transactions reported by MNEs (as seen before, provides more 
opportunities for income-shifting), and also the number of lawsuits governments have 
filed to fight abusive transfer pricing practices. Unfortunately, most of this information is 
not adequately reported in developing countries, pointing to the fact that many 
developing countries don’t have the human capacity to bring legal suits against large 
MNEs with billions of dollars in capital and teams of lawyers. 
From this review of transfer pricing and TPM we can come to the conclusion that 
it is a coordinated strategy that actors can use in order to subvert institutional authority. It 
is coordinated in the sense that it is deliberate and thought-out; it is strategic in the sense 
that it is an action made to produce better results for whoever is engaging in the activities. 
Given the knowledge of illicit financial flows, natural resource extraction and the 
complicity that some MNEs may take, it is safe to infer that those involved are motivated 
by improved profit margins through manipulation. In a sense, the practice largely benefits 
from the new financial arrangements in the current era of globalization. Recalling the 
statistics from the World Investment Reports, in 1992 and 2011, the introduction of this 
thesis mentioned that MNE parent companies has risen from 35,000 in 1990 to over 
100,000 currently, likewise, the number of foreign subsidiaries has grown even more, 
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from 150,000 in 1990 to nearly 900,000. Some private companies have benefited by 
globalization not only in their ability to chase economies of scale and integrate into an 
international consumer market. Others, often in collusion with corrupt public officials, 
have also benefited by their ability to dodge tax responsibilities in the face of different 
regulations across different borders.  
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Section Three: Trends and Characteristics of Transfer Pricing 
 
There are indications that TPM is a growing problem for countries in Africa. As 
we can recall, a Global Financial Integrity (2008) report on illicit flows documented that 
illicit financial flows through Africa alone totaled about $854 billion, but due to the 
measuring constraints, the total is more likely near $1.8 trillion; 60 - 65% of this total is 
thought to be tax evasive activities. A 2010 report by the same group (Hollingshead, 
2010) used a sophisticated methodology for estimating the extent of TPM through the use 
of corporate tax rates provided by PricewaterhouseCoopers and Heritage Foundation, and 
government revenue data obtained from the World Bank. The analysis of a number of 
developing countries estimated a loss of potential tax revenue from TPM to be between 
$98 – $107 billion, from 2002 and 2006; for Africa as a whole this number is likely a 
yearly average of nearly $3.8 billion. Despite this alarming number, there are significant 
holes in the amount of data available; the only African countries included in the analysis 
are Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. Because of these data constraints it is certain that 
the actual amount of revenue lost in Africa due to TPM is significantly underestimated. 
Another method to explore this issue is through the use of information from 
accounting firms and NGOs who have done proxy research, as well as through recent 
actions by developing country governments to regulate transfer pricing. With these 
resources, we can analyze the extent to which abusive practices are growing.  
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Transfer Pricing from a Private Perspective 
Transfer price manipulation is gaining much more attention as a global problem. 
Ernst & Young, one of the world’s largest accounting firms, recently increased the 
amount of research on transfer pricing within private firms. Since 1995, they have 
produced detailed reports on international tax matters, with a specific focus transfer 
pricing, it culminates into a yearly Global Transfer Pricing Survey. In fact, they posit 
TPM as “the leading international tax issue.” The basis for their research is the fact that 
governments are continually trying to raise revenue through taxation, that transfer pricing 
is increasingly becoming a tool used in MNE operations, and that some governments are 
reacting to this by ramping up efforts to enforce tax laws to stymie any abusive practices. 
One example of the increased attention from governments, though not fully a result of 
increased TPM, is that the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) increased the 
staff focused on international tax issues by 2,000 employees between 2009 and 2010. 
This is not a trend that is limited to rich countries though; they also indicate that 
emerging markets are also increasing enforcement measures in an effort to raise 
revenues.  
Because of pressure to increase profitability, the Global Transfer Pricing Survey 
points out that transfer pricing is becoming an increasingly important practice for 
companies to engage in. Ernst & Young has gleaned the following as the most important 
current trends: 
• Transfer pricing as “absolutely critical”: An average of 75 percent of parent and 
subsidiary companies surveyed mentioned that transfer pricing will be critical or 
very important to their organizations, if not now, in the next 2 years. 
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Furthermore, tax authorities surveyed showed varying interest, depending on the 
industry and sector; natural resource mining received 30% interest. 
 
Figure 2: Transfer pricing will be "absolutely critical" or "very important" for   
their group in the next two years3 
 
      Source: Ernst & Young, Global Transfer Pricing Survey 2010 
 
• Rules are in flux: Reviews of intrafirm trade have increased dramatically, from 7 
percent in 2007 to 42 percent in 2010. Governments and international economic 
institutions such as the OECD have revised laws on transfer pricing in the past 
few years alone. 
 
• Trends in controversy management: Litigation of transfer pricing disputes is low. 
Only 3 percent in 2007 and 10 percent now. Furthermore, only 18 percent of 
surveyed companies said they reported abusive transfer pricing practices to the 
proper authority. 
 
• Tax and efficient supply chain management: Tax considerations remain one of 
the most important reasons for restructuring and operating.  
 
• Rising audit risk: The number of audits has been increasing, particularly in 
emerging economy jurisdictions. 66 percent of respondent companies were 
audited, up from 52 percent in 2007. Over ! of companies considered 
documentation more important now than previously.  
                                                
3 Note: Only companies in countries that were both surveyed by Ernst & Young and 
appeared in the United States Geological Survey Mineral Yearbooks 2010 and 2011 as 
owning mining investments in the SACU region (See Appendix B for further details) are 
included in the Figures in this section. For this reason, percentages between the 
description and actual figures may not match. 
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Figure 3: Transfer pricing policy has been examined by a tax authority in any 
country since 2006. 
 
Source: Ernst & Young, Global Transfer Pricing Survey 
 
• More attention paid to documentation: Surveyed companies cite increased 
documentation of transfer pricing is to reduce risk of audit and litigation. 
Documentation has increased to 41 percent. (See Figure 4 below) 
 
There are two major themes that underpin the Ernst & Young analysis. First, companies 
in rich and emerging economies are the most documented in terms of using transfer 
pricing in company operations. Following the literature review on transfer pricing, this 
increase means that there is also increased opportunity to engage in TPM. Second, 
documentation for strategies for transfer pricing are scant if even available for companies 
in developing countries, speaking to the importance of creating a strategy for them. A 
table depicting a selection of survey responses is provided in Appendix A. This 
incorporates the most pertinent survey responses for this thesis, and is limited to countries 
that were surveyed by Ernst & Young who also engage in the extractive natural resource 
sector in the SACU region (United States Geological Survey 2010, 2011). 
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Figure 4: Transfer pricing documentation is prepared concurrently, on a globally 
coordinated basis 
 
              Source: Ernst & Young, Global Transfer Pricing Survey 
 
Transfer Pricing Trends in the Developing World 
Transfer pricing is a standard practice in MNEs, and is increasingly used as the 
production process continues to “go global.” The Global Transfer Pricing Survey pointed 
to a number of important trends, which particularly point to action that may be taken by 
governments to regulate transfer pricing. By exploring some of the general trends in the 
developing world, we can supplement private trends with those from the public sector.  
The first major trend from the developing world is that governments are aware that 
transfer pricing is increasing as a standard business practice, forcing policymakers to 
address its regulation. Governments are not necessarily tasked with creating a profit in 
the same way that private companies are, they are tasked with maintaining and operating 
a state. Thus, the one incentive for governments is to collect tax revenue. In 2009, 
China’s State Administration of Taxation (SAT) made all documentation of transfer 
prices mandatory after a 200 RMB threshold has been reached. There is evidence that this 
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requirement is further expanding to lower thresholds. Now, the Chinese tax authority is 
ranked as the 3rd most aggressive tax authority (Shira & Carey, 2011). Similarly, the 
Ghanaian Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) announced in March 
2012 that it would be introducing new rules for MNEs reporting requirements of transfer 
prices. This came in response to estimates that nearly $36 million were lost annually due 
to transfer pricing irregularities since a substantial increase in the number of MNEs 
entering the country after a large oil discovery in 2007 (Asiamah, 2012). 
Another trend in the developing world is the move to conform to international 
standards. The most well-known and respected standard regulating transfer pricing is the 
arms-length principle that is stated in the OECD’s Model Tax Convention 2010. 
Indonesia has recently started moving towards conforming to these standards by adopting 
language in the line with the Convention. (Transfer Pricing Associates 2010; KPMG, 
2011). Also, Egypt has been working with the OECD since 2005 to develop their own 
version of the OECD guidelines, and even made a move to establish a Transfer Pricing 
Division to aid in documentation through the countries own tax laws. It is the first of its 
kind to be issued in the Arabic language, helping to ease understanding (Mahon, 2011; 
Transfer Pricing Associates 2011). South Africa, one of the SACU countries, recently 
revised its transfer pricing laws to closely resemble the OECD guidelines, existing 
regulations tended to create uncertainty because they focused on isolated transactions 
rather than those involved in an increasingly complex production process. 
These trends from developing country governments make clear what the growing 
approaches to transfer pricing are. First, increased regulation is a move to protect due 
revenues, and second, they are motivated to conform to international guidelines, or 
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“rules-of-the-game.” The first trend makes logical sense. The second is also motivated by 
the first, but it may also follow a move to conforming to a global economy that demands 
clear rules and a culture of doing business. 
Factors to Consider 
Overshadowing this assessment, though, is the fact that transfer pricing regulations 
are still inadequate in many developing countries. Oftentimes, they are left undefined or 
give far too much power to political individuals, creating a vicious cycle; when TPM 
occurs, the state and development is undermined, and the environment for the illicit 
practice is reinforced. This is due to a mixture of capability, risk (from the private actor 
perspective) and incentive (connected to corruption). PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011), 
another major international accounting firm, also reports on transfer pricing. They 
published an article outlining the risks involved with transfer pricing in Africa 
specifically. Their report reinforce the literature that developing countries lack the 
institutional capacity, particularly in tax institutions, to enforce or create laws. Simply put 
“’the lower the sophistication of tax authorities in a particular country, the higher the 
[transfer pricing] risk’” (et. al., 2011). Following these findings, they expect that, as 
transfer pricing continues to be a medium for abuse to take place, and as countries and 
regional organizations address the issue more clearly, there will be a growing number of 
cases from Africa. Claiming it to be launched in 2011, the report also refers to an African 
Transfer Pricing Dashboard as a database to explore transfer pricing on the continent. 
However, there is currently no evidence that this has occurred, and representatives from 
PwC have not commented.  
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So far, this analysis has remained fairly neutral on the specific job functions that 
allow TPM to take place. Yet, it is also important to understand the special role that 
auditors take in the flow of illicit finance. In a study on money laundering and organized 
crime in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, Andre 
Standing and Hennie van Vuuren (2003) completed a survey of auditors who worked for 
multinational firms. The reason for surveying auditors was that they are in a unique place 
in the actor-agent relationship between MNEs doing business abroad and the ability for 
illicit economic activity to take place; they are in a position of authority to report accurate 
accounting (unless of course they are involved in corrupt practices themselves). Although 
inherently different from money laundering, the role of auditors remains similar when 
considering TPM and will thus serve as a proxy. While the scope of the respondents is as 
extensive as one would hope, those surveyed covered a number of different auditors from 
across the SADC region, including Botswana, South Africa and Swaziland (all also 
members of SACU). There were a number of interesting responses that give clues to their 
interaction with illicit flows. Notably, they find that auditors are often unaware of laws 
and mechanisms used by state authorities to combat illicit flows, and that the difficulty 
involved in identifying the flow itself further muddles the issue. This is only compounded 
by the illicit nature of the transactions themselves, as corruption and incentives can serve 
to undermine the mechanisms themselves. 
Despite the difficulty in obtaining hard data on TPM, this section, along with the 
literature review, demonstrates that there is available research and investigation that, once 
synthesized, points to the issues importance and growth. First, TPM is a standard practice 
in many MNEs (Baker, 2005; Ernst & Young, 2010). Second, a culture of corruption that 
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often clouds the extractive natural resource sector, particularly in developing countries. In 
fact, a database provided in Appendix B, extensively depicts MNE involvement in natural 
resource extraction in SACU countries, demonstrating that there may be ample 
opportunities for clandestine activity. Lastly, developing countries face the extra hurdle 
that their relative lack of institutional development leaves them at a disadvantage when 
enforcing and creating laws that can stymie abusive TPM. In the next section, the thesis 
explores the natural resource sector and the laws surrounding pricing and extraction in 
the SACU region. This will provide the basis for a strategy that uses existing institutional 
arrangements (with some suggestions for reform), as well as integrates international 
standards.  
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Section Four: Country Profiles- Extractive Resources and Associated Legislation 
 
Illicit financial flows such as transfer price manipulation include those that are 
codified in law, but also those that may lack legal status (or, technically legal). They are 
harmful for economic and human development, and the development of sound 
institutions. The problematic history of illicit flows in the natural resource sector provides 
a ripe environment for them to flourish. This section explores the extent of natural 
resource extraction in the member countries of the Southern African Customs Union, 
along with the associated legislation related to transfer pricing. Additionally, it examines 
the basic SACU framework, to analyze its strength in relation to regulation of natural 
resources. This section will reveal that transfer pricing in this sector is an under-legalized 
area for SACU countries as well as within the organization itself. This increases the 
perception that TPM has the ability to work through the existing system quite easily. 
Overall, natural resource extraction is an integral component to the economies of 
SACU countries. Exports of ores and metals (i.e. minerals), the proxy for what this paper 
has been referring to as natural resources, tend to make up large portions of their export 
base. Most recent data from the World Bank shows that they accounted for 14.54% of 
exports in Botswana (2010), about 31% in Namibia (2008) and about 33% in South 
Africa (2010). As a portion of exports in Lesotho and Swaziland, extracted minerals do 
not account for more than 5% of reported exports, but evidence from the U.S. Geological 
Survey show that they are likely to grow in importance. Below is a brief overview of 
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mining in the SACU region, country-by-country, along with the major private actors 
involved in the industry. Much of the information was gathered from the United States 
Geological Survey’s Mineral Yearbooks 2009 and 2010. 
Botswana 
 
With approximately 32% of the world’s known diamond reserves, Botswana is 
known for being the world’s largest exporter of the resource. There are also deposits of 
base metals, coal, salt and soda ash that are extracted, as well as other minerals which are 
not as widely mined but do exist, including, asbestos, feldspar, graphite, gypsum, iron 
and manganese. According to Harold R. Newman (2010) at the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS), despite these mineral endowments, Botswana still remains one of the 
most underexplored areas of the world for natural resources. This is due to the fact that 
the country is of particularly rough terrain and the infrastructure is not as extensive in 
other parts of Africa, no less, the world. While diversification away from diamond 
mining remains a significant hurdle for the future of Botswana’s economy, the prospect 
that there are untapped resources in the country may be able to assist following a decline 
in its extraction.  
Unlike many African countries, Botswana is widely considered a leader in 
economic growth, education, and good governance. A number of authors (Barclay, 2008; 
Good, 1992; Gramajo, 2005) have attributed part of the success of Botswana to relatively 
effective institutions, as well as cooperation between public and private actors. From the 
onset of independence, the government made it a priority to cooperate between the 
politically influential cattle-herding population, and foreign actors in the diamond 
business. The state was effective in redirecting revenue to human development to 
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reinforce growth and legitimize state actors. For example, the government has taken the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic seriously. In 1987, it introduced the National AIDS Control 
Programme, and updated it with the National Strategic Framework in 2003. These are 
positive developments considering that the country has one of the highest rates of its 
prevalence worldwide. Also, by law, funds from diamond revenues guarantee every 
Botswanan an education up to the age of 14. All of these factors, a favorable mineral 
investment climate, and relative political and social stability have come together to make 
Botswana a particularly attractive place for international companies to operate. Prominent 
parent companies operating from Canada, Luxembourg, United States and United 
Kingdom make up the main investors. Associated, and as reported by the USGS, the 
Botswana central government has stakes in all major mining operations, but in practice, 
resource extraction has “operated mainly on a privately-owned free market basis” 
(Newman, 2010). 
The monopoly for granting rights to mining resources in Botswana is held solely 
by the state. The legal framework for mining is set out in the Mines and Minerals Act, 
1999. This piece of legislation broadly covers the state’s involvement and sets its role as 
the preliminary decision-maker for mineral extraction. It also solidifies the government’s 
position in retaining a percentage of royalties. In terms of mining royalties, Part X 
Sections 1 and 2 states that  
“subject to the provisions of this Part, the holder of a 
mineral concession shall be liable to pay royalties to the 
Government on any mineral concession by him in the 
course of the exercise of his rights thereunder at the rates 
and in the manner prescribed under this section. The 
royalties payable shall be the following percentages of 
gross market value….” (Mines & Mineral Act 1999). 
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The legislation then continues, setting a percentage price for the amount of royalties 
depending on the type of mineral extracted. Reinforcing this law is the fact that Botswana 
has a relatively good track record of mineral management and overall governance.  
There is no available data or data estimates of the extent of TPM in Botswana. 
Despite the extent of government involvement in managing mineral royalties, as well as 
directing them to pertinent areas for human development, it lacks any basic legislation in 
regards to transfer pricing (KPMG, 2011). In fact, the Mines and Minerals Act 
specifically states that proper price setting “excludes any barter, swap, exchange, or 
special transfer pricing arrangement,” (Mines and Minerals Act, 1999, Art. X, Sec. 6) 
which may, in fact, provide a legal cover for MNEs to engage in legally illicit operations. 
From the USGS survey outlined in Appendix B, there is extensive foreign involvement in 
natural resource extraction, and according to the survey’s country report, private 
companies operate fairly freely.  In this sense, Botswana can be characterized as 
particularly vulnerable to TPM flows. Transfer pricing is under-legalized, perhaps even 
encouraged by legislation that excludes regulation on the practice. This does not follow 
proper market-based price setting, since it should include adjustments for all of the costs 
that firms are expected to incur. The ignorance of the law may actually serve to the 
detriment of Botswana as it could be potentially losing revenue. 
Lesotho 
 
Lesotho has a long history of mining. Diamonds remain the most prominent 
resource, although there are also deposits of agate, clay, sand, gravel and stone. However, 
most of the extraction of these other resources serves a narrow domestic consumption 
 45 
market rather than moving internationally. Despite the widespread belief that Lesotho has 
substantial amounts of minerals, there has not been much investment in exploration due 
to the poor condition of physical infrastructure. In fact, the USGS reports that there is no 
future increased investment in mining that is expected (Newman, 2010). After the USGS 
publication, though, Gem Diamonds, a UK-based company, announced that it would be 
investing an additional $230 million into a diamond mine in Lesotho, as well as opening 
a cutting and polishing plant (Finance24, 2012). This is no small feat for a country who’s 
2010 GDP was just over $2.1 billion (World Bank, 2012). Development such as these are 
a reminder of how quickly private actors can make decisions to begin or increase 
operations internationally. As of now, the ownership of diamond mines is shared between 
the Lesotho government and companies located in the United Kingdom. It will be 
interesting to assess the future impact of the Gem Diamonds investment. In the 
meantime, many challenges remain for Lesotho as a whole as it remains fairly 
underdeveloped. 
Despite the lower starting point in exploiting Lesotho’s mineral resources, there is 
a substantial history of legislation governing this area. The Mines and Minerals Act 2005 
governs the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, and the Precious Stones 
Order 1970 governs the production, sale and export of precious stones such as diamonds 
(Newman, 2010). Both laws outline the royalties paid to the government, much like 
Botswana. Specifically, the 1970 legislation states that 15 percent of diamond royalties 
are to be paid to the government. Although, the obvious difference is that Lesotho’s 
resources have been vastly underexploited compared to Botswana. Lesotho has not had 
the same opportunity to direct royalties towards development needs, nor does it share the 
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same track record in governance. Though, with Gem Diamonds’ investment of $230 into 
diamond extraction (Finance24, 2012), we should soon be able to track the potential 
impact that royalties have.  
 For transfer pricing, Lesotho relies on broader tax law. Direct tax law in Section 
113 bestows a broad range of powers to a tax commissioner to distribute and allocate 
income to reflect the true income of both corporations and individuals (SADC, 2012). 
Supposedly this rule is applied to stymie any tax avoidance, including transfer pricing. 
However, the vague and extraordinary powers may actually create the incentives to 
engage in clandestine activities. It is more important to mention that transfer pricing does 
not receive explicit mention and is therefore left in legal limbo. Given that Lesotho 
remains a fairly underdeveloped country, as well as the fact that legal development 
doesn’t reflect the growing challenges of MNEs and cross-border illicit financial 
activities, Lesotho is vulnerable to these flows. This is also only likely to increase as 
foreign companies perk interest in the availability of natural resources. 
Namibia 
 
Namibia is one of the world’s top producers of diamonds (3rd) and uranium (4th 
and accounting for 8% of world’s production). Other than these two, it also has deposits 
of: arsenic, gold, lead, manganese, silver, zinc, dolomite, granite, marble, salt, 
semiprecious stones, sodalite, sulfur, and wollastonite. There is a diverse group of foreign 
actors who are involved in resource extraction, including: Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Iran, Luxembourg, South Africa and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the substantial 
trade relationship between Namibia and the United States supports this industry; a large 
amount of minerals are exported to the US, Namibian imports include capital and 
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technology to support the extractive industry. Economic outlooks see steady growth in 
the economy as the world continues to recover from the 2008 recession, and demand for 
diamonds continues to increase. Though, long-term prospects for growth may be 
constrained by a gradual decline in the amount of the resources available for mining. To 
stymie this, government policies are promoting the expansion of investments in other 
minerals, as well as attracting monitoring and scanning for additional mineral resources 
that are not currently mined. Though, this will continue to be a long-term constraint on 
Namibia, and economic diversification should remain a top priority.  
Namibian laws for the natural resource sector are outlined in the Minerals Act, 
1992, which grants permissions for prospecting and mining, and the Diamond Act, 1999, 
which provides further detail for law regarding specifically diamond mining- particularly 
in setting prices. Notably, it establishes a Diamond Board of Namibia that is responsible 
for creating a diamond fund to direct royalties towards development measures, and is 
supposed to act as a middleman for the various controls that are outlined in the law itself. 
The limited transfer pricing law in Namibia requires MNEs registered in the country to 
conform to an arms-length principle (KPMG, 2012). This is a generally accepted 
agreement that transfer prices will reflect market value for goods. However, while the 
Diamond Board is supposed to act as a middleman, the Minister of Mines and Energy has 
complete control over setting of prices along this arms-length principle. Part VI Section 
44 states  
“the market value of any unpolished diamond shall be 
determined in writing by the Minister having regard to the 
value agreed upon between the person who sells or 
otherwise disposes of that diamond and the person to whom 
that diamond is sold or otherwise disposed of in an at 
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arm’s-length sale and prices which are in the opinion of the 
Minister at the particular time paid on international markets 
for such diamonds, less any amounts deducted in respect of 
fees, charges or levies which are in the opinion of the 
Minister charged  on international markets” (Diamond Act, 
1999). 
 
In effect, the law sets up a perfect environment for corruption to flourish. While on paper, 
the accountability in pricing should reflect international norms and standards, the 
ultimatum lies with the opinion of the Minister. Thus, a political (i.e. judicial) mechanism 
fail to provide appropriate checks and balances. At the same time, a proper market 
driving mechanism through the arm’s length principle is denied ability for scrutiny. 
Namibian law for transfer pricing seems to have taken one step forward, but two steps 
back. Instead it has opened the doors for politicians to set prices at the same time that 
private companies may be taking advantage of the underdeveloped legal system. 
South Africa 
 
South Africa remains one of the world’s most important countries for mining. 
Substantial amounts of the world’s extraction of a number of minerals make up the 
industry, including: platinum (79% of global production), chromium (60%), palladium 
(41%), manganese (14%), gold (9%), and others. Other important minerals include, 
diamond, shale, nickel, iron ore, aluminum and phosphate rock. While mineral extraction 
remains a mainstay of the South African economy, there are still some concerns. 
Production has increased in a number of notable minerals such as iron ore and shale, but 
for the most part, production of other resources is steadily decreasing. Generally, the 
South African natural resource extraction sector operates privately, a notable difference 
given that most other SACU country governments took a substantial stake in the sector, 
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although the government has a preference for domestically owned companies through the 
Black Economic Empowerment initiative that has been an important policy in the post-
apartheid government. Amongst a number of South African companies operating 
domestically, foreign actors are quite diverse, including companies from: Australia, 
Canada, China, Finland, France, India, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, 
Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. Beyond mineral 
diversification, the relative sophistication of the South African financial sector, its 
comparative level of development, and political stability continue to make the country an 
attractive place to invest. Though, given the gradual decline in the number of some 
resources, the South African government should take the creation of a long-term 
economic plan for diversification seriously. 
Policy for mineral extraction in South Africa is set in the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act, 2002. The Preamble for the law sets the general tone for the 
sector. It says that implementation of the act is  
“to make a provision for equitable access to sustainable 
development… [that will] promote economic and social 
development… emphasizing the need to create an 
internationally competitive and efficient administration and 
regulatory regime.” (Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, 2002). 
 
Within the body of legislation itself, it sets out the ownership and regulatory controls for 
the mineral sector. Under the auspices that this is for the protection and development of 
the sole owners of the resources- South Africans, much control is granted to the Minister 
of Mineral Resources and the broader Department of Mineral Resources. Interestingly, 
one of the few mentions of finance in the legislation comes towards the end of the 
 50 
document in Chapter 7, Section 107, Part 2 which simply states “no regulation relating to 
State revenue or expenditure may be made by the Minister except with the concurrence of 
the Minister of Finance.” In other words, fiscal policy is the duty of the appropriate 
department. Setting appropriate finance arrangements then requires that sector’s specific 
department to be left out, regardless of the important information regarding resource 
extraction that can be gained from them.  
South Africa does have an explicit legal framework for transfer pricing, though. 
According to Ernst & Young (2011), the main transfer pricing legislation is set out in the 
Income Tax Act of 1962, “Section 31 authorizes tax authority to adjust the consideration 
for goods or services to an arm’s length price for the purposes of computing the South 
African taxable income of a person.” South Africa, though not a member of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), officially conforms 
to its transfer pricing guidelines. Yet, with these regulations in mind, recall the extent to 
which trade misinvoicing is pervasive in South Africa. According to the estimates from 
Global Financial Integrity (Hollingshead, 2010), South Africa loses a yearly average of 
between about $1 billion and nearly $4 billion dollars from this practice. This begs the 
question whether this is a larger problem in the less developed legal systems of the other 
SACU countries.  
Swaziland 
 
Information about the mineral sector in Swaziland is not readily available. This is 
despite the country being rich in a number of highly priced minerals such as: coal, 
diamond, gold, kaolin and silica, the Swazi natural resource sector has not recently 
gained much attention from foreign investors. It may be likely that, as the amount of 
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extraction declines in other areas of the world, Swaziland may experience higher levels of 
investment. The limited amount of foreign involvement in the mining industry includes 
companies based in South Africa and the United Kingdom; government holds a 
substantial stake in mining operations as well. 
Mineral legislation in Swaziland is fairly new. It is outlined in the Mines and 
Mineral Act, No. 4, 2011. This law grants decision-making power for prospecting, 
extraction and production licenses to a Mineral Board. Interestingly, the members of the 
Board, once chosen, are by law granted immunity from civil proceedings during their 
tenure. All the while, the export and import of minerals requires a special license that 
functions through a Board process. These two characteristics are a clear avenue for 
corrupt actions, as members can grant licenses on an ad hoc basis, and perhaps also enjoy 
kickbacks from special relationships. To further this hypothesis, financial payments of 
mineral royalties are paid directly “to the iNgwenyama [the King] in trust for the Swazi 
Nation,” and “if the Commissioner is satisfied that any minerals sold or disposed of 
otherwise than in an arms-length transaction, the Commissioner shall determine the gross 
sale value of the minerals…” (Swaziland Government Gazette, Part VIII, Art. 132, Sec. 1 
and 4). These legal provisions echo what Atul Kohli mentioned as the neo-patrimonial 
state. As evidenced by the numerous developmental challenges faced by Swaziland, the 
resources of the state are considered to be personal patrimony of government officials 
rather than the people themselves. Overall, the tone of business and government is rooted 
in corruption and a lack of democratic accountability. This is the perfect environment for 
illicit activities to flourish. 
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SACU Framework 
 
Intrafirm trade with the natural resource sector means that there is a point of 
origin through a foreign subsidiary within a country, and a number of points where goods 
move out of the country. This means that there are many instances in which the 
movement of goods is subject to the payment of customs duties. These are the critical 
points where transfer price manipulation can take place. The existing framework for the 
payment of duties solidifies the importance of the SACU arrangement in confronting 
TPM.  
The Southern African Customs Union (2007) is the oldest customs union in the 
world. Its origins lie in a 1910 agreement for customs cooperation between South Africa 
(which included present-day Namibia until the 1990), Basutoland (Lesotho), 
Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland. From the onset, the union worked to set a 
common external tariff. Also, one of the more recent features of SACU is a revenue-
sharing formulation, which allocates revenue from customs duties paid amongst the 
member countries. In the wake of the post-independence wave that swept much of Africa, 
the SACU agreement was renewed and amended in 1969. This process addressed BLNS 
(non-South African members) country concerns that South Africa had too much power 
within the organization. Until then, South Africa had the sole power to set the customs 
duties and excise taxes for the union. There were also concerns that South Africa entered 
the union into a number of preferential trade agreements that only benefited itself rather 
than all SACU members. From these concerns, the change included a power sharing 
agreement. The agreement was further renewed and amended in 2002, and extended the 
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democratic process: including Committees and Bodies representing interests and sectors 
within member states, and an annually rotating Secretariat to be headquartered in 
Windhoek, Namibia. There was also a call to set up a Tribunal to serve as a dispute 
settlement mechanism, which though technically written into the agreement, has yet to be 
implemented. Furthermore, and of particular interest, given the extent of transfer pricing, 
the 2002 agreement addresses a commitment of member countries to respond to 
international pressures, including both foreign public and private interests. 
Beyond the facilitation of the movement of goods in the region, the 2002 SACU 
agreement contains a number of broadly defined objectives. As a summary, they included 
three main themes: sustainable development of all SACU countries- a recognition that 
member countries are at different levels of development, yet face similar problems; 
deepening of the economic relationship between member countries, including a 
harmonization of external economic policies; and the creation of a globally competitive 
SACU market. To simplify the overall economic objective of SACU, it specifically states 
in Part 5, Article 18, Sections 1 and 2, Free Movement of Domestic Products, that  
“goods grown, produced or manufactured in the Common 
Customs Area, on importation from the area of one 
Member State to the area of another Member State, shall be 
free of customs duties and quantitative restrictions, except 
as provided elsewhere in this Agreement…Member States 
have the right to impose restrictions on imports or exports 
in accordance with national laws and regulations for the 
protection of…health of humans, animals or plants; the 
environment; treasures of artistic, historic or archeological 
value; public morals; intellectual property rights; national 
security; and exhaustible natural resources.” (Southern 
African Customs Union, 2002). 
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A layout of substantial goals for trade liberalization, followed by a list of exemptions, is 
not uncommon in these agreements. The most well known example of this is the extent to 
which the World Trade Organization (WTO) allows member countries to protect certain 
areas of their economies, which has arguably allowed for developed countries to maintain 
high subsidies in agricultural products where developing countries tend to have 
competitive advantages. Thus, the SACU agreement is not unique in the regard that it 
strives to create a “free” agreement that is, in reality, distorted. The main concern this 
paper identifies is that exhaustible resources remain an important component of the 
broader regional economy, but they are left out of regulation by SACU. This is 
exasperated by stratified policies, per country, regarding taxation and pricing for goods in 
this sector. This provides more opportunities for TPM to take place. After the 2002 
agreement, the WTO assessed the SACU trade and tax policy and echoed concerns over 
regulation of the natural resource sector, saying  
“mineral taxation, for example, has enabled the 
improvement of basic infrastructure and social services. 
Furthermore, the sector is one of the most important foreign 
exchange sources and a magnet for foreign investment in 
these countries. Large mineral endowment has meant low 
tariff protection, and private investment continues to be 
encouraged in the sector” (Trade Policy Review Body, 
2003, p. vii). 
 
In addition to this, there is concern that tariff rates between member countries are too 
complex. Duties for certain goods include ad valorem, specific, mixed, compound and 
formulaic duties. This complexity can be confusing, rather than conforming to them in 
the way that SACU’s goal to harmonize and simplify customs regulations. In order to 
address important issues like the regulation of duties in natural resource trade, and stymie 
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any possible transfer price abuse, the process for setting duties needs to be both clear and 
enforced by capable authorities.   
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Section Five: A Way Forward 
 
 In order to address the issue of TPM through multinational enterprises, we must 
understand the process. In the Section 1of this paper, Figure 1 conceptualizes how, within 
MNEs, goods move out of the country are sold to parent companies or other subsidiaries 
along a complex value chain. If the amount of goods is misinvoiced, this is the point 
where illicit activities take place. The actors involved include individuals in the private 
sector (at both the subsidiary/ies and parent), custom officials, relevant tax authority 
higher in the administrative hierarchy, and policymakers that are tasked with framing 
laws. Though not directly involved, the issue also involves the citizenry, who often bear 
the burden of inefficient governments and illicit flows. To address this issue requires a 
multi-pronged approach. This involves addressing both pricing in the natural resource 
sector, as well as coordination of broader transfer pricing rules at the country-level. 
Given that this issue is of regional customs interest, SACU is the most appropriate 
vehicle to drive this process. However, this also involves amendments, and a 
strengthening of the capability of SACU members. A sufficient strategy is based on 
existing international standards for both transfer pricing, through the OECD, and 
transparency in extractive resources, through the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI).  
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Integrating International Standards 
 The OECD is comprised of a group of countries mostly in Europe and North 
America. It aims to promote economic growth and development for primarily member 
countries, but also provides useful analysis for others. Working towards building an 
understanding of new challenges that face the global economy, it also serves to 
coordinate policies concerning a range of different topics and issue areas. In the most 
recent 2010 Transfer Price Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, the OECD states corporate governance and regulation of the global 
information economy as areas that present some of the biggest challenges.  
TPM is often a reaction to government regulation. Regulation has not caught up 
with the pace of the globalization of the production process. The OECD explicitly states 
that governments should not view tax discrepancies, as a result of transfer price 
differences, to necessarily be outright manipulation. This is because the multi-layered 
structures of regulation make accounting a much more complex process.  Though, the 
OECD still cautions that this reasoning cannot be rationale to assume that some MNEs 
are not engaging in illicit activities. Overall, transfer pricing cannot be regarded as an 
exact science, making analyses and strategies like these all the more important. 
The two main themes of the OECD standards are 1) a recognition of “separate 
entities” and 2) the “arm’s length principle.” The former is a presupposition that 
reinforces the arm’s length principle, which is really the heart of OECD standard. The 
“separate entities” clause is found in Article 9 Paragraph 1 of the overall OECD Model 
Tax Convention, and states  
 58 
“[Where] conditions are made or imposed between the two 
[associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial 
relations which differ from those which would be made 
between independent enterprises, then any profits which 
would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the 
enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not so 
accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise 
and taxed accordingly.” (Organisation for Economic 
Development and Co-operation, 2010, p. 33) 
 
Though it may appear to have fairly vague language, it aims to simplify transfer pricing. 
In setting transfer prices the separate parent and subsidiaries must treat each other as 
though they are separate entities (aptly put) rather than members of a unified entity. The 
simplification rests in the sense that regulators, accountants and auditors within the MNE, 
are then able to focus  
“on the nature of the transaction between the members and 
on whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions 
that would be obtained in comparable uncontrolled 
transactions” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2010, p. 33).  
 
This comparability is essential for successfully following the OECD guidelines because it 
allows the MNE and government to accurately calculate tax liabilities. Price setting is 
guided by the arm’s length principle that basically states that the gross market value for 
the good is the governing price. In tandem with the separate entities clause, this should 
streamline the process for setting appropriate taxes at each stage of the production 
process, from extraction to selling. 
 Following OECD guidelines is one thing, but given the likely extent of TPM, 
along with evidence from the Ernst & Young survey, there are bound to be disputes.  It is 
unlikely that a global court process for illicit flows such as these will be created, no 
matter how easy of a fix that would be. Instead, there are certain steps that can be taken to 
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address the problem judiciously, as well as respect the autonomy of sovereign states. 
First, it is important to understand the burden-of-proof in tax disputes. Different countries 
have different regulations considering burden-of-proof. Again, the OECD provides an 
adequate model. According to Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, the same 
Convention that lays out transfer pricing guidelines, it is important for countries to take a 
position of good faith, and a “cooperative approach.” More specifically, it suggests that 
states should request the necessary adjustments for discrepancies when it seems as though 
the arm’s length principle has not been adhered to. Given the clandestine nature of TPM, 
this is best because stating the burden-of-proof as in the hands of those that are 
committing the crime simply does not make sense.  At the same time, the role of private 
companies is not to make sure that government is getting its due revenue, it is to create 
and grow profits for shareholders and other stakeholders. The government’s role is to 
maintain a functioning state for the well being of its citizens. Thus, the regulating and 
policing role should squarely be in the hands of the state. 
There also is a need for a proper penalty process. The treatment of penalties is 
important because an uncooperative environment can create incentives for MNEs to 
further engage in TPM. Penalties should be agreed upon between states a priori to the 
offense so that it is clear what the consequences of being guilty of TPM. Furthermore, 
states should consider entering into advanced pricing arrangements (APAs) in order to 
agree to a terms of transfer pricing before any discrepancy can take place. This way, there 
is a clear precedent to follow if arbitration and penalties take place. Article 25 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention suggests that arbitration of offenses should only occur if 
adjustments have not been made from 2 years from the date of offense. Though, 
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cooperation remains key because the actual “starting point” of the actual offense may be 
opaque and must be agreed upon. Though, this depends on who the main actor in the 
offense is. For SACU countries who have some sort of relatively independent regulation 
in place (e.g. Botswana, Lesotho, and South Africa), this will likely include points where 
resources cross the border at customs, thus likely be in the hands of the MNEs. However, 
with countries that lack relatively independent regulations (e.g. Namibia and Swaziland), 
the point of origin in the offense may be far before the resources get to a customs station 
and may likely involve political actors. Of course, within this simplification of the origin 
of offenses, there are likely layers of relationships and operations that can also harbor the 
illicit activity. This makes a clear definition of the point of origin imperative for 
successful development of transfer pricing regulations. 
 Though is essential for confronting TPM, adhering to OECD guidelines not an 
easy task. However, one does not need to be part of the OECD to sign on to guidelines; 
according to the OECD, South Africa is the only SACU country that has done so. 
Though, for the BLNS countries, signing on to this agreement is the one of the first tasks 
to begin the process of taking transfer pricing seriously. There are often too many 
vagaries in their pricing of extractive resources that makes any serious attempt to address 
TPM moot. The most notable example of this is Swaziland, where the gross market price 
for extractive resources is supposed to govern, but the Minister can change this at-will if 
he or she disagrees (not to mention the legal status of the Swazi King to act as the 
ultimate caretaker for state monies). The OECD guidelines for TPM are important 
because MNE parent companies often originate in countries that are members of this 
organization, or are on similar development levels; they should all be guided by either the 
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same or similar principles. It can only serve as a tool for accountability and a 
simplification of the process.  
Officially agreeing and creating laws to conform to the OECD Model Tax 
Convention should be a goal of each SACU country, though the SACU arrangement itself 
should develop a dispute mechanism to take on arbitration of disputes within and any 
transaction involving members states. Currently, paying adjustment penalties under the 
OECD guidelines is explicitly “non-mandatory,” the SACU institution can make a clear 
statement that TPM will not be tolerated if it reforms to state otherwise. 
 Addressing transfer pricing with the adequate laws are important, but this does 
not take away the fact that the extractive resource sector is often fraught with corruption 
and illicit activities. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is the most 
well known international effort to demand transparency in this sector. It is  
“a global effort to make natural resources benefit all; a 
coalition of governments, companies, and civil society; and 
a standard for companies to publish what they pay and for 
governments to disclose what they receive.” (Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, 2009).  
 
Currently no SACU countries are Compliant nor are they considered Candidate countries. 
The first step to becoming a Compliant country is to publicly state willingness to begin 
the process of determining status by the EITI. After this, the country must begin a public 
process of appointing stakeholders within the different economic sectors and eventually 
develop a strategic work plan to begin the process of implementation. Once this process 
is approved, Candidate countries have two and a half years to begin implementation. 
There are 15-requirements that must be completed to gain Compliant status; they are 
broken down into broad categories that include: 
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• Preparation- The government is required to ensure the full participation of and 
engagement with stakeholders from all sectors. The process for agreeing on 
reporting templates must be agreed upon, and must comply with international 
standards.  
 
• Disclosure- The government must ensure all companies disclose payments, as 
well as disclose all of its own revenues, to stakeholders. A multi-stakeholder 
group is created to ensure that these reports are accurate as well as to account for 
any discrepancies.  
 
• Dissemination- The stakeholder group must prepare and make the disclosure 
report publicly available and part of public debate.  
 
• Review and validation- Private company stakeholders must agree to the EITI 
implementation. The government and stakeholder group must verify the findings 
of the report and submit proper paperwork to EITI. 
 
After the country has been validated as Compliant, its status is then reviewed every five 
years to ensure that it is still following the guidelines for transparency. The complete 
table specifying the 20-step process to gaining compliance is available in Appendix C.  
Of course this process is much easier said than done. It requires a great deal of 
political will on behalf of governments who may not have the capacity to implement the 
requirements, or may even be corrupt themselves. Also, it requires active involvement on 
behalf of companies in extractive resources that may be actively involved in illicit 
financial flows, and therefore have little incentive to cooperate. Coordinating action 
between sectors and stakeholders who may often be at odds with each other is a 
monumental undertaking. Though, there are some signs of progress outside and 
implementation of the standards from outside of the SACU region. A number of countries 
have already become Compliant, and a number of African countries are actually at the 
Candidate stage. Since TPM is a large global problem, it is advisable that both SACU 
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countries and those countries who are home to parent companies to begin the process. 
Between both these groups of countries, only the USA has publicly stated willingness. 
Reforming SACU 
 
 Beginning the process of submitting to international standards is quite a large 
task. Overall, to take these international standards seriously, creating regional policy 
aimed towards TPM requires political commitment as well as increased deepening of the 
SACU integration. The 2002 reforms of the agreement have widely expanded the 
participation of all states and stakeholders within states into the institution itself. Despite 
this, the broadening of the democratic space in SACU actually needs to be directed more 
appropriately- particularly where they can be useful in regard to addressing TPM. One 
obvious change is to address the lack of a Technical Liaison Committee for the natural 
resources sector. These committees are important because they advise the institution on 
pertinent issues in that area, which includes setting customs duties for certain goods. 
Given that natural resources are such an important factor in SACU economies, having a 
working committee for this sector should be one of the first priorities. Creating this 
should also go in tandem with amending the 2002 agreement to relax customs targeting 
restrictions in the natural resource sector because they are currently an exception.  
It is also essential to complete the tribunal. A proper dispute resolution 
mechanism is vital to the workings of these agreements because it allows for a process of 
accountability and precedence. Arbitration of transfer pricing disputes is on the rise 
globally, and though the OECD sets out guidelines for adjudicating disputes, they lack 
the necessary teeth to implement regulations and penalties. SACU can be a leader in this 
area.  
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Given that TPM is a global crime that includes countries outside of the region, it 
is suggested that SACU use these suggested mechanisms, along with those that already 
exist, to continue and deepen the relationship amongst its members. It allows for a 
cohesive and cooperative stance to combat an issue that involves much larger and, 
oftentimes, powerful actors, and is in line with its goal to address trade external the 
region in a more integrated way.    
A Note on Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
At times throughout this thesis it may seem as though private actors are sole 
drivers of TPM; that the motive to increase profits and take advantage of countries with 
weak capacity wrests with them. This thesis does not shy away from the notion that some 
private MNEs are certainly complicit, but it should not be viewed as the only actor at 
fault. As referenced through the neo-patrimonial state, sometimes state authorities at 
various levels are complicit in illicit activities as well. Given the amount of capital and 
influence that private MNEs have compared to developing countries, it is important to 
address TPM from the perspective that responsibility rests with governments to control 
and regulate these flows. However at the same time, there is much that can be said about 
private companies being responsible for their own actions. Corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) is an important aspect of corporate governance that many companies already take 
seriously. Though CSR continues to grow in popularity as both a business practice and 
marketing tool, transfer pricing rarely enters these strategies (Sikka & Willmott, 2010, p. 
344). Private actors, who are primarily responsible to produce results for shareholders 
and other stakeholders, must also view the success of their business to consumers and 
larger society. They have a stake seeing growth and development because it expands the 
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market for their products. A truly successful strategy for tackling tax evasion certainly 
includes buy-in from private actors. Although the strategy and reforms outlined here do 
not offer specifics for corporate reform, the EITI framework certainly includes 
involvement on behalf of MNEs. 
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Section Six: Conclusion 
 
Challenges for the Future 
 
 Implementing the suggested strategy for SACU to address TPM will be a 
monumental undertaking. It will likely take years, or even decades, and will likely need 
additional changes in the future, as the global economy will surely continue to evolve as 
well. One of the most significant challenges will be addressing changes in the natural 
resource sector in general. Mineral resources are exhaustible, and therefore 
nonrenewable. Even though SACU countries, and Africa in general, are arguably 
“untapped” in some areas (USGS, 2011, 2012), the amount of mineral resources will 
decline in the long-term. There will be significant consequences that will result in 
structural changes of the SACU economies. These consequences may take two forms. 
 First, and more pessimistic, is the view that a decline in available extractive 
minerals may create incentives for MNEs to act more aggressively as the resources for 
their profits decline. Fewer resources may increase their profits as commodity prices 
increase, and this can increase aggressive business motives. When this is coupled with 
collusion from public officials who are attracted by the FDI, this can reinforce a nature of 
illicitness. Even if steps to stymie TPM are put into place, the abuse of transfer prices 
may return; if steps are not taken, the practice could only increase. 
 Second, and slightly less pessimistic, is the notion that in the long-term, as 
mineral resources are depleted, there is less MNE involvement in the natural resource 
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sector. This may act to shrink the space for a corrupt environment. Though, this line of 
thinking must be taken with caution for SACU growth because of their current 
dependence on the sector. This change may only be positive if the region, and countries 
diversify their economies. 
 Regardless of its legal status, TPM is an illicit flow. Furthermore, it is likely a 
significant problem in the natural resource extraction sector, given the existing nature of 
corruption that is often present. The countries of the Southern African Customs Union are 
largely dependent on natural resources, and likely lose much needed revenue from this 
activity. Indications from South Africa, which happens to have the most sophisticated 
legal network to regulate TPM, estimate a loss of almost $4 billion per year. This is a 
significant development issue because it undermines state capacity to govern effectively, 
as well as decreases amount of revenue that can be directed towards development. 
Developing strategies to face this challenge are not easy. The SACU institution itself is 
an ideal actor to drive this, but it requires reforms to increase institutional deepening, an 
expansion of democratic representation for the natural resource sector, as well as a 
regional judicial process within the union. To be taken seriously, it should also work 
towards integrating to international standards on transfer pricing as well as encourage 
member countries to being the process of EITI compliance for the resource sector. 
 Regardless of these challenges, the fact remains that TPM must be addressed. By 
implementing the necessary regulations, the legal environment will be able to confront 
any additional challenges on much stronger footing. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Laws are laws, but they are only as good as they are enforced. One of the main 
issues that this thesis does not address adequately, because of both time and scope, is the 
need to continue to develop effective government capacity. Transfer price manipulation 
takes from tax revenues that can enhance development. Tackling this type of tax evasion 
requires government capacity, so it is important that the strategy presented is taken 
seriously. Though, it should be incorporated into a larger developmental strategy that 
incorporates other areas for reform within issue areas. 
It is important to bring all stakeholders to the table in facing these challenges. 
Governments need to create the political willpower to see TPM as an issue that is 
draining the state of money, private MNEs need to realize the important role they play in 
development and see that it can create even more profits for them, and citizens need to 
demand accountability and good practice from both public and private actors. The SACU 
institution, including the individual member countries, has the opportunity to be leaders 
in Africa and for the rest of the world on tackling transfer price manipulation. The global 
nature of this illicit flow requires coordination between countries and sectors, but taking 
the necessary steps to control this illicit flow can create positive results for all involved. 
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Appendix A 
 
Selected Results from 2010 Global Transfer Pricing Survey
4
 
Importance of 
Transfer 
Pricing Australia Canada China Finland France Germany Japan India Netherlands 
South 
Africa Spain Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Transfer 
pricing is the 
most 
important tax 
issue for their 
group 36% 12% 30% 29% 28% 36% 33% 35% 16% 30% 19% 62% 24% 19% 
Transfer 
pricing 
documentation 
is more 
important now 
than it was 
two years ago 40% 64% 70% 79% 92% 84% 83% 95% 72% 60% 100% 77% 67% 69% 
Transfer 
pricing policy 
has been 
examined by a 
tax authority 
in any country 68% 72% 20% 75% 88% 88% 53% 45% 80% 40% 75% 92% 82% 90% 
                                                
. “Global Transfer Pricing Survey 2010: Top 6 Trends in Transfer Pricing.” http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Services/Tax/International-
Tax/2010-Global-Transfer-Pricing-Survey. Website accessed: March 2012. 
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Importance of 
Transfer 
Pricing Australia Canada China Finland France Germany Japan India Netherlands 
South 
Africa Spain Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Examinations 
resulting in an 
adjustment 
(known 
outcomes) 18% 17% 100% 12% 75% 37% 32% 44% 53% 0% 18% 52% 20% 25% 
Transfer 
pricing 
documentation 
viewed as 
adequate upon 
audit 65% 72% 100% 65% 50% 86% 38% 89% 79% 50% 64% 65% 50% 72% 
Tax authority 
threatened to 
impose 
penalties 33% 33% 0% 33% 25% 27% 29% 60% 45% NA 33% 33% 48% 33% 
Penalties were 
imposed 
(known 
outcomes) 0% 0% 0% 67% 44% 0% 29% 20% 36% NA 33% 7% 4% 17% 
Intercompany 
financing 
transactions 
have 
undergone 
review 53% 44% 100% 59% 20% 55% 0% 89% 74% 75% 36% 57% 43% 19% 
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Importance of 
Transfer 
Pricing Australia Canada China Finland France Germany Japan India Netherlands 
South 
Africa Spain Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Highest 
priority in 
driving 
transfer 
pricing 
strategy is tax 
risk 
management 68% 28% 60% 50% 52% 40% 73% 45% 68% 60% 50% 35% 51% 54% 
Transfer 
pricing 
documentation 
is prepared 
concurrently, 
on a globally 
coordinated 
basis 48% 48% 10% 54% 44% 48% 7% 40% 48% 40% 38% 73% 47% 38% 
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Appendix B 
 
Structure of the Mineral Industries
5
 and Location of Owner/s 
Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
Botswana Clay 
Lobatse Clay Works (Pty.) Ltd. (Botswana Development 
Corp. and Interklin Corp joint venture) 
Lobatse, 70 kilometers 
south- southwest of 
Gabarone Gabarone, Botswana; Houston, USA 
  Makoro Brick and Tile (Pty.) Ltd. 
Makoro, 10 kilometers 
south of Palapye Botswana 
 Coal 
Morupule Colliery (Pty) Ltd. (Anglo American Corp. of 
South Africa Ltd. And related firms, 93.3%) 
Morupule, 270 kilometers 
northwest of Gabarone London, UK 
 Diamond 
Debswana Diamond Co. (Pty.) Ltd. (Government, 50%, 
and De Beers Centenary AG, 50%) 
Jwaneng Mine, 115 
kilometers west of 
Gabarone Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
   do.
6
 
Orapa Mine, 375 kilometers 
north of Gabarone do. 
                                                
5
 United States Geological Survey Minerals Information. Mineral Yearbook Vol. III: Area Reports International 2009 and 2010. 
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/myb.html. Accessed: March 2012.  
 
6
 Do. = ditto 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
Botswana 
(cont’d)  do. 
Letlhakane Mine, 350 
kilometers north of 
Gabarone do. 
   do. 
Damtshaa Mine, 220 
kilometers west of 
Francistowh do. 
  
Tswapong Mining Co. (Pty.) Ltd. (De Beers Prospecting 
Botswana Ltd., 85% and Government, 15%) 
Tswapong Mine, 275 
kilometers northeast of 
Gabarone Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
 
Gemstones, 
seimprecious Agate Botswana (Pty.) Ltd. 
Processing plant at Pilane, 
45 kilometers north of 
Gabarone Botswana; United Kingdom 
 Gold IAMGOLD Corp. 
Mupane Mine, near 
Francistown Toronto, Canada 
 
Nickel-copper-
cobalt 
Bamangwato Concessions Ltd. (BCL), (Government, 
15%, and Botswana RST Ltd., 85%, of which LionOre 
Mining International Ltd., 12.65%) 
Selebi-Phikwe Mines, 350 
kilometers northeast of 
Gabarone Botswana; Toronto, Canada 
   
Tati Nickel Mining Co. (Pty.) Ltd. (LionOre Mining 
International Ltd., 85% and Government, 15%) 
Phoenix and Selkirk Mines, 
23 kilometers east of 
Francistown Toronto, Canada 
  Masa Precious Stones (Pty.) Ltd. 
Bobonong, east of Selebi-
Phikwe Botswana 
 Salt 
Botswana Ash (Pty.) Ltd. (Government, 50%, and Anglo 
American plc, 50%) 
Sua Pan, 450 kilometers 
north of Gabarone London, UK 
 Soda ash do. do. do. 
Lesotho Diamond Gem Diamond Ltd., 70%, and Government 30% 
Letseng Mine, northern 
Lesotho London, UK 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
Lesotho 
(cont’d)   
Liqhobong Mining Development Co. (Kopane Diamond 
Developments plc, 75%, and Government, 25%) 
Liqhobong Mine, northern 
Lesotho London, UK 
Namibia Cement 
Ohorongo Cement (Pty) Ltd. (Schwenk Zement KG, 60%; 
Industrial Development Corp., 20%; Development Bank 
of Namibia, 10%) 
Otjozondjupa region, near 
Otavi 
Ulm, Germany; South Africa; 
Namibia 
 Copper:      
 
Copper 
concentrates 
Weatherly Mining Namibia Ltd. (Weatherly International 
plc, 100%) 
Central operations, includes 
the Otjihase Mine and 
concentrator, about 30 
kilometers north of 
Windhoek; and the 
Matchless Mine, 80 
kilometers southwest of the 
Otjihase Mine London, UK 
   do. 
Northern operations, 
includes the Tschudi and 
the Tsumeb West Mines, 
and the Tsumeb 
concentrator do. 
   do. 
Kombat operations, 
includes Kombat Mine and 
concentrator, 440 
kilometers north of 
Windhoek do. 
 
Metal, blister 
copper 
Namibia Custom Smelters (Pty.) Ltd. (Dundee Precious 
Metals Inc., 100%) Smelter at Tsumeb Toronto, Canada 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
Namibia 
(cont’d) Diamond 
De Beers Marine Namibia [De Beers Société Anonyme, 
70% and Namdeb Diamond Corporation (Pty.) Ltd., 30% 
Atlanta 1 license area, 
offshore Sperrgebiet 
Switzerland; London; UK; 
Luxembourg, Luxembourg;  
   Diaz Exploration (Pty.) Ltd. Offshore operation Namibia 
  
Joint venture of Diamond Fields (Pty.) Ltd. (Diamond 
Fields International Ltd., 100%) and Bonaparte Dimaond 
Mines NL 
Mining License 111, 
offshore Luderitz 
West Perth, Australia; Vancouver, 
Canada 
   
Namdeb Diamond Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. (Government, 
50%, and De Beers Société Anonyme, 50%) 
Mining Area 1, from 
Orange River to 145 
kilometers north of 
Orangemund;includes 
Pocket Beaches Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
  do. 
Northern Areas and 
Elizabeth Bay Mines,24 
kilometers south of 
Luderitz do. 
  do. 
Orange River Mines, from 
mouth of Orange River east 
to Sendelingsdrif; includes 
the Auchas and the Daberas 
Mines do. 
   do. 
Beach and marine 
contractors do. 
   
Sakawe Mining Corp. (Samicor) (LL Mining Corp., 76%, 
and Government, 8%) 
Offshore mining licenses, 
near Luderitz Bay Israel 
 
Fluorspar, acid 
grade  
Okorusu Fluorspar (Pty.) Ltd. (Solvay Fluor GmbH, 
100%) Mine and plant at Okorusu Hannover, Germany 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
Nambia 
(cont’d) Gold ore AngloGold Ashanti Namibia (Pty.) Ltd. 
Navachab Mine, 170 
kilometers northwest of 
Windhoek 
London, UK; Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
 Gold metal 
Namibia Custom Smelters (Pty.) Ltd. (Dundee Precious 
Metals Inc., 100%) 
Coproduct contained in 
blister copper produced at 
the copper smelter at 
Tsumeb Toronto, Canada 
 
Lead, Pb 
content of 
concentrate 
Rosh Pinah Zinc Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. [Exxaro 
Resources Ltd., 50.04%; Jaguar Investments Holdings, 
38.98%; PE Minerals  (Namibia) (Pty.) Ltd., 8%] 
Rosh Pinah Mine, near 
Rosh Pinah 
Pretoria, South Africa; Sydney, 
Australia; Namibia 
 
Pyrite, 
concentrate 
Weatherly Mining Namibia Ltd. (Weatherly International 
plc, 100%) 
Otjihase Mine and 
concentrator, near Tsumeb London, UK 
 Salt: Cape Cross Salt (Pty.) Ltd. North of Henties Bay Namibia 
   
Salt & Chemicals (Pty.) Ltd. [Walvis Bay Salt Holdings 
(Pty.) Ltd., 100%] Salt pan at Walvis Bay South Africa 
   Salt Company (Pty.) Ltd. Swakopmund Brisbane, Australia 
   
Walvis Bay Salt Refiners (Pty.) Ltd. [Walvis Bay Salt 
Holdings (Pty.) Ltd., 100%] Salt refinery at Walvis Bay South Africa 
 Silver:      
 
Concentrate, 
Ag content 
Rosh Pinah Zinc Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. [Exxaro 
Resources Ltd., 50.04%;, Jaguar Investments Holdings, 
38.98%; PE Minerals  (Namibia) (Pty.) Ltd., 8%] 
Rosh Pinah Mine, near 
Rosh Pinah 
Pretoria, South Africa; Sydney, 
Australia; Namibia 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
Namibia 
(cont’d) Metal 
Namibia Custom Smelters (Pty.) Ltd. (Dundee Precious 
Metals Inc., 100%) 
Coproduct contained in 
blister copper produced at 
the copper smelter at 
Tsumeb Toronto, Canada 
 
Uranium, 
uranium oxide 
Langer Heinrich Uranium (Pty.) Ltd. (Paladin Energy 
Ltd., 100%) 
Langer Heinrich Mine. 80 
kilometers east of Walvis 
Bay Subiaco, Australia 
   
Rössing Uranium Ltd. (Rio Tinto Group, 69%; 
Government of Iran, 15%; Industrial Development Corp. 
of South Africa Ltd., 10%; Government of Namibia, 3%; 
other minority shareholders, 3%) 
Rössing Mine, 65 
kilometers northeast of 
Swakopmund 
London, UK; Melbourne, Australia; 
South Africa; Iran 
 Wollastonite Namibia Mineral Development Co. (Pty.) Ltd. Usakos Mine Windhoek, Namibia 
 Zinc:    
 
Concentrate, 
Zn content 
Rosh Pinah Zinc Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. [Exxaro 
Resources Ltd., 50.04%; Jaguar Investments Holdings, 
38.98%; PE Minerals  (Namibia) (Pty.) Ltd., 8%] 
Rosh Pinah Mine, near 
Rosh Pinah 
Pretoria, South Africa; Sydney, 
Australia; Namibia 
 Ore 
Skorpion Mining Co. (Pty.) Ltd. (Vedanta  Resources plc, 
100%) 
Skorpion Mine, 25 
kilometers north of Rosh 
Pinah London, UK 
 Metal Namzinc (Pty.) Ltd. (Vedanta Resources plc, 100%) 
Skorpion solvent extraction 
facilities and 
electrowinning refinery, 25 
kilometers north of Rosh 
Pinah London, UK 
South 
Africa Aluminum BHP Billiton Ltd. 
Hillside smelter at Richards 
Bay London, UK; Melbourne, Australia 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   do. 
Bayside smelter at Richards 
Bay do. 
 Andalusite Imerys Group 
Thabazimbi Mine near 
Thabazimbi France 
   do. Annesley Mine at Penge do. 
   do. Havercroft Mine at Penge do. 
   do. 
Krugerspost Mine, near 
Lydenburg do. 
   
Andalusite Resources (Pty) Ltd. [African Mineral Trading 
and Exploration (Pty) Ltd.] 
Maroeloesfontein, near 
Thabazimbi, Northern 
Province Johannesburg, South Africa 
 Antimony Consolidated Murchison Ltd. (Metorex Pty. Ltd., 100%) 
Consolidated Murchison 
Mine near Gravelotte Gansu, China 
 Cement 
Pretoria Portland Cement Co. (Pty) Ltd. (Barloworld 
Trust Co. Ltd., 68%) 
De Hoek, Dwaalboom, 
Hercules, Jupiter, Port 
Elizabeth, Riebeeck, and 
Slurry plants Johannesburg, South Africa 
   Alpha Ltd. [AfriSam Consortium (Pty) Ltd., 48.5%] Dudfield and Ulco plants South Africa; Switzerland 
   Lafarge South Africa Ltd. (Lafarge S.A.) 
Lichtenburg plant in North 
West Province Paris, France 
  
Natal Portland Cement Co. (Pty) Ltd. (Cimentos de 
Portugal SGPS, S.A., 98%) Simumu plant Lisbon, Portugal 
 Chromite Xstrata plc, 79.5%, and Merafe Resources Ltd., 20.5% Boshoek Mine at Boshoek
2
 
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK;  
Johannesburg, South Africa 
   do. 
Kroondal Mine at 
Rustenburg do. 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(Cont’d)   do. 
Thorncliffe Mine at 
Steelpoort do. 
   do. Helena Mine at Steelpoort do. 
   do. Waterval Mine
2
 do. 
   do. Horizon Mine at Pilansberg do. 
   Samancor Chrome Ltd. (Kermas Group Ltd., 100%) 
Eastern Chrome Mines in 
Steelpoort Valley, 
Mpumalanga Province United Kingdom 
   do. 
Western Chrome Mines in 
Northern Province
2
 do. 
   International Ferro Metals Ltd. Buffelsfontein Mine Sydney, Australia 
   
Nkomati Joint Venture (African Rainbow Minerals Ltd., 
50%, and OJSC MMC Norilsk Nickel, 50%) 
Nkomati Chrome Mine in 
Mpumalanga Province 
 Johannesburg, South Africa; 
Moscow, Russia 
   
Assmang Ltd. (African Rainbow Minerals Ltd., 50%, and 
Assore Ltd., 50%) 
Dwarsrivier Mine in 
Mpumalanga Province Johannesburg, South Africa 
   Bayer (Pty) Ltd. Rustenburg Chrome Mine Kempton Park, South Africa 
  
Dilokong Chrome Mine (Pty) Ltd. [ASA Metals (Pty) 
Ltd., 100%] 
Dilokong Mine, near 
Burgersfort in Mpumalanga 
Province China; South Africa 
   National Manganese Mines (Pty) Ltd. 
Buffelsfontein Mine at 
Mooinooi Parklands, South Africa 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   Anglo Coal Ltd. (Anglo American plc, 100%) 
Goedehoop, Greenside, 
Isibonelo, Kleinkopje,Kriel, 
Landau, Mafube, New 
Denmark, New Vaal and 
Nooitgedacht Mines London, UK 
   Exxaro Resources Ltd. (BEE Holdco, 52.3%) 
Grootegeluk Mine in 
Limpopo Province South Africa 
   do. 
Matla Mine in Mpumalanga 
Province do. 
   do. 
Arnot Mine in Mpumalanga 
Province do. 
   do. 
North Block Mine in 
Mpumalanga Province do. 
   do. 
Leeuwpan Mine in 
Mpumalanga Province do. 
   do. Inyanda Mine do. 
   do. 
New Clydesdale Mine in 
Mpumalanga Province do. 
   do. 
Tshikondeni Mine in 
Limpopo Province do. 
   
Anglo American plc, 50%, and Exxaro Resources Ltd., 
50% Mafube Mine London, UK; Pretoria, South Africa 
   Sasol Ltd. Syferfontein Mine Johannesburg, South Africa 
   do. Brandspruit Mine do. 
   do. Middelbult Mine do. 
   do. Bosjesspruit Mine do. 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   do. Twistdraai Mine do. 
   do. Mooikraal Mine do. 
  
BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd., 84%, and 
Xstrata plc, 16% Middelburg Mine  
London, UK; Melbourne, Australia; 
Zug, Switzerland 
  BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd. Khutala underground mine London, UK; Melbourne, Australia 
   
BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd., 84%, and 
Xstrata plc, 16% Douglas Mine  
London, UK; Melbourne, Australia; 
Zug, Switzerland 
   BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd. Klipspruit Mine London, UK; Melbourne, Australia 
   Xstrata plc, 74% 
Goedgevonden Mine at 
Witbank London, UK; Zug, Switzerland 
   Xstrata plc, 79.8% 
Tweefontein Division 
(Boschmans, South 
Witbank, Waterpan, and 
Witcons Mines) at Witbank  London, UK; Zug, Switzerland 
   do. 
iMpunzi Division (Phoenix 
and Tavistock Mines) at 
Witbank do. 
   do. 
Southstock Division at 
Witbank do. 
   do. 
Mpumalanga Division 
(Spitzkop and Tselentis 
Mines) at Breyten and 
Ermelo do. 
   Optimum Coal Holdings (Pty) Ltd Optimum Mine Johannesburg, South Africa 
   do. Koornfontein Mines do. 
   
Shanduka Coal (Pty) Ltd. (Glencore International AG, 
70%, and Shanduka Resources (Pty) Ltd., 30%) 
Bankfontein, Graspan, 
Lakeside, Leeuwfontein, 
and Townlands Mines  
Baar, Switzerland; St. Hellier, 
Jersey; Johannesburg, South Africa 
   Coal of Africa Ltd. Mooiplaats Mine South Africa 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   
Kangra Group Pty. Ltd. [Shanduka Resources (Pty) Ltd., 
30%] 
Savmore and Welgedacht 
Mines Johannesburg, South Africa 
   Stuart Coal Group Stuart Colliery Kempton Park, South Africa 
   NuCoal Mining (Pty) Ltd. Woestalleen Mine  Newcastle, Australia 
   Total Coal SA (Pty) Ltd. 
Forzando North and 
Forzando South Mines France 
   do. Dorsfontein Mine do. 
 Copper 
Palabora Mining Co. Ltd. (Rio Tinto Ltd., 57%, and 
Anglo American plc, 29%) 
Palabora Mines at 
Phalaborwa London, UK; Melbourne, Australia 
   do. Smelter at Phalaborwa do. 
   do. Refinery at Phalaborwa do. 
   
Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd. (Anglo American 
plc, 74.1%)  
Amandebult, Rustenburg, 
and Union sections; and 
Bafokeng Rasimone, 
Lebowa, Modikwa, 
Potgietersrust, and Western 
Limb Mines London, UK 
   do. 
Rustenburg Base Metal 
Refiners do. 
  
Black Mountain Mineral Development Co. (Pty) Ltd. 
(Anglo American plc, 74%) 
Black Mountain Mine near 
Aggeneys in Northern Cape 
Province London, UK 
 Diamond 
De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd. (Anglo American plc, 
29%) 
Venetia Mine in Northern 
Province London, UK 
   do. 
Finsch Mine, 100 
kilometers west of 
Kimberley do. 
   do. 
Kimberley surface mines, 
Kimberley do. 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)  do. 
Namaqualand Mine near 
Kleinzee do. 
   do. Voorspoed Mine do. 
   do. South Africa Sea Areas do. 
   Petra Diamonds Ltd. Cullinan Mine Jersey 
   do. 
Helam, Sedibeng, and Star 
Mines do. 
   do. 
Koffiefontein Mine in Free 
State Province do. 
   do. 
Kimberley underground 
mines, Kimberley
2
 do. 
   Trans Hex Group Ltd. 
Baken, Bloeddrif, Reuning, 
and Saxendrift Mines Cape Town, South Africa 
 Fluorspar 
Witkop Fluorspar Mine (Pty) Ltd. (subsidiary of Sallies 
Ltd.)  Witkop Mine at Zeerust
2
 Pretoria, South Africa 
   do. 
Buffalo Mine at 
Mookgopong
2
 do. 
   
Vergenoeg Mining Corp. (Pty) Ltd. [Minerales  Y 
Productos Derivados SA (Minersa), 85%] 
Vergenoeg Mine at Rust de 
Winter Spain 
 Gold:      
 Mine AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. (Anglo American plc, 41.8%) 
Vaal River operations: 
Kopanang Mine  London, UK 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Great Noligwa Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Tau Lekoa Mine  do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Moab Khotsong Mine  do. 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   do. do. do. 
   do. 
West Wits operations: Tau 
Tona Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Savuka Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Mponeng Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
  Gold Fields Ltd. Kloof Mine Johannesburg, South Africa 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Driefontein Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Beatrix Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. South Deep Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
   Harmony Gold Mining Co. Ltd. 
Bambanani, Masimong, 
Phakisa, and Tshepong 
Mines Melrose Arch, South Africa 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Evander operations do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Elandsrand Mines do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Virginia Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Target Mine do. 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   do. do. do. 
   do. Kalgold Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
  do. Doornkop Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
   DRDGold Ltd. Blyvooruitzicht Mine Roodeport, South Africa 
   do. do. do. 
  do. Crown Mine do. 
   do. do. do. 
  do. East Rand Proprietary Mine do. 
   do. Ergo Mine do. 
   First Uranium Corp. Ezulwini Mine Toronto, Canada 
   do. 
Mine Waste Solutions 
Project (MWS) do. 
   Gold One International Ltd. Modder East Mine Australia 
   Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd.  Buffelsfontein Mine Rivonia, South Africa 
   do. 
Transvaal Gold Mining 
Estate (TGME) do. 
   
Barberton Mines Ltd. [Metorex Ltd., 54%, and Shanduka 
Resources (Pty) Ltd., 26%]  
Eastern Transvaal 
Consolidated Division 
(Fairview, New Consort, 
and Sheba Mines) 
Gansu, China; Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
   Central Rand Gold Ltd. 
Central Rand Goldfield 
near Johannesburg Roodeport, South Africa 
 Refined 
Rand Refinery Ltd. (AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., 53%, and 
Gold Fields Ltd., 33%) 
Germiston, Gauteng 
Province 
London, UK; Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
 Iron and steel:    
 Iron ore Kumba Iron Ore Ltd. Sishen Mine at Sishen London, UK 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   do. 
Thabazimbi Mine at 
Thabazimbi do. 
   Assmang Ltd.  Khumani Mine South Africa 
   do. 
Beeshoek Mine near 
Postmasburg do. 
   
Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Ltd. (Ervaz Group 
S.A., 79%) 
Mapochs Mine at 
Roossenekal London, UK 
   Xstrata plc Rhovan Mine at Brits Zug, Switzerland; London, UK 
   Vametco Minerals Corp. (Ervaz Group S.A., 81%) 
Krokodilkraal Mine and 
plant near Brits London, UK 
 Ferroalloys Xstrata plc, 79.5%, and Merafe Resources Ltd., 20.5% Wonderkop  
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK; 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
   do. Rustenburg do. 
   Xstrata plc, 69.6%, and Merafe Resources Ltd., 30.4% Lydenburg  
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK; 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
   Xstrata plc, 79.5%, and Merafe Resources Ltd., 20.5% Lion plant at Steelpoort 
Zug, Switzerland; London, UK; 
Johannesburg, South Africa 
   do. Boshoek do. 
   Samancor Chrome Division (Kermas Group Ltd., 100%) 
Plants at Middelburg, 
Steelpoort, and Witbank United Kingdom 
   Hernic Ferrochrome (Pty) Ltd. (Mitsubishi Corp., 51%) Plant at Brits Tokyo, Japan 
   
ASA Metals (Pty) Ltd. (Sinosteel, 60%, and Limpopo 
Economic Development Enterprise, 40%) 
Plant near Pietersburg, 
Northern Province China; South Africa 
  Assmang Ltd. 
Machadodorp plant in 
Mpumalanga Province Johannesburg, South Africa 
   International Ferro Metals Ltd. 
Plant in North West 
Province Sydney, Australia 
   Tata Steel Ltd. Richards Bay India 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   
Samancor Manganese (Pty) Ltd. (BHP Billiton Ltd., 60%, 
and Anglo American plc, 40%) Plant at Meyerton London, UK; Melbourne, Australia 
   Assmang Ltd. 
Cato Ridge plant in 
KwaZulu Natal Province Johannesburg, South Africa 
   
Advalloy (Pty) Ltd. [Samancor Manganese (Pty) Ltd., 
100%] 
Furnace at Samancor's 
Meyerton plant 
London, UK; Melbourne, Australia; 
South Africa 
   Renova Group Plant at Witbank Russia 
   do. do. do. 
  Silicon Technology Pty Ltd. NA Newcastle, South Africa 
   Grupo Ferroatlantica Rand Carbide plant Madrid, Spain 
   Vanchem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd. Plant at Witbank Emalahleni, South Africa 
   Xstrata plc Rhovan plant at Brits Zug, Switzerland; London, UK 
   Vametco Minerals Corp. Smelter near Brits London, UK 
   Ruukki Group Oyj Mogale plant Finland 
   ArcelorMittal South Africa Ltd. Vanderbijlpark plant Luxembourg; London, UK 
  do. Newcastle plant do. 
   do. Saldanha plant do. 
   do. Vereeniging plant do. 
  Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Ltd. Witbank South Africa 
  Columbus Stainless (Pty) Ltd. (Acerinox SA, 76%) 
Stainless steel plant at 
Middelburg Madrid, Spain 
   Scaw Metals Group (Anglo American plc) 
Germiston plant, 
Johannesburg London, UK 
   Davsteel Division (Cape Gate Pty. Ltd.) 
Vanderbijlpark plant, 
Gauteng South Africa 
   Cape Town Iron & Steel Works (Pty) Ltd. 
Kuilsrivier plant, Cape 
Town South Africa 
   Duferco Steel Processing Ltd. 
Cold-rolled slab steel plant 
at Saldanha Bay Saldanha, South Africa 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d) Lead Black Mountain Mineral Development Co. (Pty) Ltd.  
Black Mountain Mine near 
Aggeneys in Northern Cape 
Province Johannesburg, South Africa 
 Lime 
PPC Lime Ltd (subsidiary of Pretoria Portland Cement 
Company Ltd.) Plant at Lime Acres South Africa 
   Idwala Lime (Idwala Industrial Holdings) Plant at Daniëlskuil  South Africa 
   
Inca Lime (Pty) Ltd. [subsidiary of Inca Mining (Pty) 
Ltd.] 
Plant at Immerpan, 
Limpopo Province Hampshire, UK 
 Manganese Assmang Ltd.  
Nchwaning Mine near 
Black Rock Johannesburg, South Africa 
  do. 
Gloria Mine near Black 
Rock do. 
   Samancor Manganese (Pty) Ltd.  
Mamatwan and Wessels 
Mines near Hotazel in 
Northern Cape Province United Kingdom 
   Renova Group Kalahari Mine Russia 
   Metmin (Metorex Pty. Ltd., 100%) 
Open pit mine in North 
West Province Gansu, China 
   
Manganese Metal Co. Pty. Ltd. [Samancor Manganese 
(Pty) Ltd., 51%] 
Electrolytic plant at 
Nelspruit United Kingdom 
 Nickel Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd.  
Amandebult, Rustenburg, 
and Union sections; and 
Bafokeng Rasimone, 
Lebowa, Modikwa, 
Potgietersrust, and Western 
Limb Mines London, UK 
  do. 
Rustenburg Base Metal 
Refiners do. 
   Impala Platinum Ltd.  Impala Mines Netherlands 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   do. Impala Refining Services do. 
   do. Base Metals Refinery do. 
  Lonmin plc 
Marikana Mines (Eastern 
Platinum, Karee, and 
Western Platinum) near 
Rustenburg and Limpopo 
Mine London, UK 
   do. Base Metals Refinery do. 
  Nkomati Joint Venture  
Nkomati Mine in 
Mpumalanga Province 
Moscow, Russia; Johannesburg, 
South Africa 
 
Nitrogen, 
ammonia Sasol Ltd.  
Plants at Sasolburg and 
Secunda Johannesburg, South Africa 
 Petroleum:      
 Crude 
Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa, 55%, 
and Pioneer Natural Resources Co., 45% Pioneer offshore field  
Cape Town, South Africa; Dallas, 
USA 
  Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa 
Oribi field, 140 kilometers 
southwest offshore from 
Mossel Bay Cape Town, South Africa 
   do. Oryx field  do. 
 Refined 
Shell and BP Refineries Pty. Ltd. (Shell SA Energy, 50%, 
and BP Southern Africa, 50%) Sapref refinery in Durban 
The Hague, Netherlands; London, 
UK 
   Engen Ltd. (62%) Engen refinery in Durban Cape Town, South Africa 
  
National Petroleum Refiners of South Africa Pty. Ltd. 
(Sasol Ltd., 63.6%) Natref refinery in Sasolburg Johannesburg, South Africa 
   Caltex Oil SA Pty. Ltd. (private, 100%) 
Calref refinery in Cape 
Town NA 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d) 
Phosphate 
rock 
Phosphate Development Corp. Ltd. (Foskor Ltd.) 
(Industrial Development Corp., 100%) 
Foskor Mine and plant at 
Phalaborwa South Africa 
   Fer-Min-Ore Ltd. Plant at Germiston South Africa 
   do. Plant at Isithebe do. 
 
Phosphoric 
acid Sasol Ltd.  Plant at Phalaborwa Johannesburg, South Africa 
 
Platinum-
group metals Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd.  
Bathopele, Khomanani, 
Khuseleka, Siphumelele 
and Thembelani Mines London, UK 
   do. do. do. 
 
Platinum-
group Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd.  
Dishaba and Tumela Mines 
at Northam London, UK 
   do. do. do. 
   Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd., 85% Union Mine at Swartklip London, UK 
   do. do. do. 
   
Bafokeng Rasimone Platinum Mine (Royal Bafokeng 
Nation, 67%, and Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd., 
33%) 
Bafokeng Rasimone 
Platinum Mine at Rasimone South Africa; London, UK 
  do. do. do. 
   
Kroondal Platinum Mines (Anglo American Platinum 
Corp. Ltd., 50%, and Aquarius  Platinum Ltd., 50%) Kroondal Mine London, UK; Netherlands; Australia 
  
Modikwa Platinum Mine (Anglo American Platinum 
Corp. Ltd., 50%, and African Rainbow Minerals, 50%) 
Modikwa Mine at 
Makgemeng 
London, UK; Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
  do. do. do. 
   Anglo American Platinum Corp. Ltd. 
Mogalakwena Mine at Ga-
Masenya London, UK 
   do. do. do. 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   do. 
Mototolo Mine at 
Steelpoort do. 
   do. do. do. 
   do. 
Polokwane smelter at 
Polokwane do. 
   do. 
Mortimer smelter at 
Swartklip do. 
   do. Waterval smelter do. 
   do. 
Mortimer, Polokwante, and 
Waterval smelters do. 
   do. Precious Metals Refinery do. 
   
Impala Platinum Ltd. (Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., 
100%) 
Impala Mines, near 
Phokeng in North West 
Province Netherlands 
   do. do. do. 
   Impala Platinum Ltd.  Marula Mine at Bothashoek Netherlands 
   do. do. do. 
   do. Smelter near Phokeng do. 
  do. Smelter near Springs do. 
   do. Refinery near Phokeng do. 
   Impala Platinum Ltd.  
Precious metals refinery, 
near Springs in Guateng 
Province Netherlands 
   Lonmin plc 
Marikana Mines near 
Maroelakop London, UK 
   do. do. do. 
   do. 
Precious Metals Refinery at 
Western Platinum do. 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   
Northam Platinum Ltd. (Anglo American Platinum Corp. 
Ltd., 22.5%, and Mvelaphanda Resources Ltd., 21.9%) 
Zondereinde Mine near 
Northam 
London, UK; Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
   do. do. do. 
   
Marikana Platinum Mine (Anglo American Platinum 
Corp. Ltd., 50%, and Aquarius  Platinum Ltd., 50%) Marikana Mine London, UK; Netherlands; Australia 
   do. do. do. 
   
Everest Platinum Mine (Aquarius Platinum Ltd., 50.5%, 
and Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., 20%) 
Everest Platinum Mine at 
Lydenburg
2
 Netherlands; Australia 
   Aquarius Platinum Ltd. Blue Ridge Mine Netherlands; Australia 
   Platmin Ltd. Pilanesberg Mine  Centurion, South Africa 
   Xstrata plc, 74% Eland Mine London, UK 
   
Anooraq Resources Corp., 51%; Anglo American 
Platinum Ltd., 49% Bokoni Mine at Sefateng 
Johannesburg, South Africa; 
London, UK 
   do. do. Zug, Switzerland; London, UK 
  
Two Rivers Platinum Mine (Pty) Ltd. (African Rainbow 
Minerals Ltd., 55%, and Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd., 
45%) 
Two Rivers Platinum Mine 
near Steelpoort 
Johannesburg, South Africa; 
Netherlands 
   do. do. do. 
   Eastern Platinum Ltd. (Eastplats) 
Crocodile River Mine at 
Arbourfell Vancouver, Canada 
   Platinum Australia Pty Ltd. (PLA) Smokey Hills Mine West Perth, Australia 
 Pyrophyllite Idwala Industrial Minerals (Benoni) 
Ottsdal Mine in North West 
Province South Africa 
   
Wonderstone Ltd. (The Associated Ore & Metals Corp. 
Ltd.) 
Pyrophylite (wonderstone) 
mine, Johannesburg, South Africa 
   G&W Base and Industrial Minerals Pty. Ltd. Piet Retief Mine South Africa 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d) Silicon Grupo Ferroatlantica 
Polokwane plant, near 
Pietersburg Madrid, Spain 
 Silver Rand Refinery Ltd. 
Germiston, Gauteng 
Province Singapore 
 Sulfur Sasol Ltd.  
Plants at Sasolburg and 
Secunda Johannesburg, South Africa 
 Synthetic fuels Sasol Ltd.  Coal to oil plant at Secunda  Johannesburg, South Africa 
   Petroleum Oil and Gas Corporation of South Africa 
Natural gas to petroleum 
products plant at Mossel 
Bay Cape Town, South Africa 
 Titanium:    
 
Titanium 
concentrates 
Richards Bay Minerals (BHP Billiton Ltd., 37%; Rio 
Tinto plc, 37%; Blue Horizon Investments, 24%) 
Open cast operations, near 
Richards Bay 
London, UK; Melbourne, Australia; 
Tempe, USA 
   Exxaro Resources Ltd. 
Mine near Brand-se-Baai 
and mineral separation 
plant at Koekenaap Pretoria, South Africa 
   do. 
KZN Sands Mine near 
Richards Bay do. 
 Titanium slag Richards Bay Minerals (RBM)  Smelter at Richards Bay London, UK 
   Namakwa Sands Ltd.  
Smelter at Vredenberg, 
Saldanha Bay area Pretoria, South Africa 
   Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Ltd. Steel plant at Witbank London, UK 
  Exxaro Resources Ltd. 
Empangeni smelter near 
Richards Bay Pretoria, South Africa 
 Uranium oxide AngloGold Ashanti Ltd. 
Vaal Rivers operation, near 
Klerksdorp 
London, UK; Johannesburg, South 
Africa 
   First Uranium Corp. Ezulwini Mine Toronto, Canada 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d) 
Vanadium 
pentoxide 
Highveld Steel and Vanadium Corp. Ltd. (Ervaz Group 
S.A., 79%) 
Mapochs Mine near 
Lydenburg London, UK 
   do. Plant at Witbank do. 
   Xstrata plc Rhovan Mine at Brits Zug, Switzerland; London, UK 
   Vametco Minerals Corp. 
Krokodilkraal Mine and 
plant near Brits London, UK 
   Vanchem Vanadium Products Pty Ltd.  
Wapadskloof Mine and 
plant, 60 kilometers 
northeast of Middelburg Emalahleni, South Africa 
 Vermiculite Palabora Mining Co. Ltd.  
Palabora Mine and plant at 
Phalaborwa London, UK 
 Zinc 
Zinc Corp. of South Africa Ltd. (Exxaro Resources Ltd., 
100%) 
Struisbult Springszinc 
refinery at Springs, 
southeast of Johannesburg Pretoria, South Africa 
   Black Mountain Mineral Development Co. (Pty) Ltd.  
Black Mountain Mine near 
Aggeneys in Northern Cape 
Province London, UK 
 Zirconium Richards Bay Minerals (RBM) 
Open cast mines near 
Richards Bay London, UK 
   Namakwa Sands Ltd.  
Mine near Brand-se-Baai 
and mineral separation 
plant at Koekenaap Pretoria, South Africa 
   Exxaro Resources Ltd. 
Hillendale Mine near 
Richards Bay, KwaZulu 
Natal Province  Pretoria, South Africa 
   Palabora Mining Co. Ltd.  
Palabora Mine and plant at 
Phalaborwa London, UK 
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Country Commodity Major operating companies and major equity owners Location of main facilities 
Location of Owners  
(Parent Company)  
South 
Africa 
(cont’d)   do. 
Zirconium sulfate plant at 
Phalaborwa do. 
   
Phosphate Development Corp. Ltd. (Foskor Ltd.) 
(Industrial Development Corp., 100%) Plant at Phalaborwa South Africa 
   do. Fused zirconia plant do. 
Swaziland Coal Maloma Colliery Ltd. Maloma Mine at Maloma South Africa 
 Ferrovanadium 
Swazi Vanadium (Pty) Ltd. (Xstrata plc, 75%, and Tibiyo 
Taka Ngwana, 25%) Plant at Maloma Zug, Switzerland; London, UK 
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Appendix C 
 
Requirements for EITI Implementing Countries
7
 
  EITI Candidate EITI Compliant 
In order to apply for EITI Candidacy:  Before the end of the EITI Candidacy Period To retain EITI Compliance 
Sign-Up Requirements Preparation Requirements 
Retaining Compliance 
Requirements 
1) The government is required to issue an 
unequivocal public statement of its intention to 
implement the EITI 
6) The government is required to ensure that civil society is 
fully, independently, actively and effectively engaged in the 
process. 
21) Compliant countries must 
maintain adherence to all the 
requirements in order to retain 
Compliant status. 
2) The government is required to commit to work 
with civil society and companies on the 
implementation of the EITI 
7) The government is required to engage companies in the 
implementation of the EITI   
3) The government is required to appoint a senior 
individual to lead on the implementation of the EITI 
8) The government is required to remove any obstacles to the 
implementation of the EITI   
4) The Government is required to establish a multi-
stakeholder group to oversee the implementation of 
the EITI 
9) The multi-stakeholder group is required to agree a definition 
of materiality and the reporting templates   
5) The multistakeholder group, in consultation with 
key EITI stakeholders, should agree and publish a 
fully costed work plan, containing measurable 
targets, and a timetable for implementation and 
incorporating an assessment of capacity constraints. 
10) The organization appointed to produce the EITI 
reconciliation report must be perceived by the multi-stakeholder 
group as credible, trustworthy and technically competent.    
                                                
7
 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. “EITI Rules, 2011 Edition, including the Validation Guide.” EITI International 
Secretariat Oslo. Version: 1 November 2011. 
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  Before the end of the EITI Candidacy Period (cont’d)   
 
 11) The government is required to ensure that all relevant 
companies and government entities report.  
  
12) The government is required to ensure that company reports 
are based on accounts audited to international standards   
  
13) The government is required to ensure that government 
reports are based on accounts audited to international standards   
  Disclosure Statements   
  
14) Companies comprehensively disclose all material payments 
in accordance with agreed reporting templates   
  
15) Government agencies comprehensively disclose all material 
revenues in accordance with the agreed reporting templates.   
  
16) The multi-stakeholder group must be content that the 
organization contracted to reconcile the company and 
government figures did so satisfactorily   
  
17) The reconciler must ensure that the EITI Report is 
comprehensive, identifies all discrepancies, where possible 
explains those discrepancies, and where necessary makes 
recommendations for remedial actions to be taken.   
  Dissemination Requirements   
  
18) The government and multi-stakeholder group must ensure 
that the EITI Report is comprehensive and publicly accessible in 
such a way to encourage that its findings contribute to public 
debate.   
  Review and Validation Requirements   
  
19) Oil, gas and mining companies must support EITI 
implementation.   
  
20) The government and multi-stakeholder group must take 
steps to act on lessons learnt, address discrepancies and ensure 
that EITI implementation is sustainable. Implementing countries 
are required to submit Validation reports in accordance with the 
deadlines established by the Board.   
!
